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PART I. INTRODUCTION
Less than three years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted
investment crowdfunding regulations (“Reg. CF”) to facilitate small companies’ efforts to raise
capital and jumpstart employment.1 Reg. CF provides companies2 potentially one of the most
disruptive transformations in capital markets.3 Its potential has been lauded as a possible vehicle
to democratize capital formation and to decentralize investments by way of the Internet.4

1

See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, et al. (2016) [hereinafter SEC Crowdfunding Act]; adopted
pursuant to the Jumpstart Our Business Companies Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–05, Title III, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) [hereinafter JOBS Act].
2
The term “company” represents small companies that provide notice filings under Reg. CF notwithstanding
the actual entity classification, e.g. limited liability company or a partnership.
3
William Hinman, Director, SEC, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), Remarks at
the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, San Francisco, CA (June 14, 2018) (the Director of the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance states that “[s]ome people believe that this technology will transform e-commerce
as we know it”). See also Howard Marks, How Crowdfunding is Disrupting VCs, FORBES (June 10, 2018)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmarks/2018/06/10/how-crowdfunding-is-disrupting-vcs/#4a105f174823.
4
Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Companies, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1013, 1065–66 (2016)
(recommending a resale exemption to avoid subjecting small stockholders to the risk of fraud-on-the-market and
to limit disclosure requirements). See also, Lenore Palladino, Democratizing Investment, (May 15, 2018)
(unpublished
paper,
available
at
Roosevelt
Institute/Smith
College,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194693#, p. 17) ( arguing that “if portals act as connectors
rather than thick intermediaries, small investors could, in theory, gain more of the wealth flowing from private
companies”).
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However, scholars have raised numerous questions about the companies, the
investments and the costs of offerings under Reg. CF. Questions and concerns raised include
whether: companies would refrain from using this newly crafted exemption in light of the
regulatory complexity and exorbitant costs;5 the quality of investment offerings would
jeopardize or keep investors away; unsophisticated investors could fall prey to purchasing
inappropriate securities;6 whether investors would invest in these offerings have been debated
before and after adoption of the regulations;7 Reg. CF might become the “go to” exemption for
companies with the worst credit ratings;8 and alternatives may render Reg. CF of little effect.9
This method of companies crowdfunding securities through intermediaries (“broker
dealers” or “funding portals”) and offering the securities for sale to the general public is referred
to as “investment crowdfunding.” However, two clarifications about this usage should be
noted. First, scholars refer to this type of financing method in several other ways: equity
crowdfunding,10 securities crowdfunding,11 and securities crowdsourcing.12 As the focus of
this article is on both a company’s attempt to formulate capital and the suitability of securities
for investors, the term investment crowdfunding seems most appropriate in this context.
Second, investment crowdfunding could also be used to refer to crowdfunding campaigns that
5

Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 27–29 (2015). Dibadj argues that
offerings in excess of $500,000 were less discouraging, and predicts that “crowdfunding will have precious little
impact.” Id. at 41. See also, Patricia H. Lee, Access to Capital or Just More Blues? Issuer Decision-making Post
SEC Crowdfunding Regulation, 18 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 19, 68–69 (2016) (suggesting that high
regulatory costs, liability and public disclosure compliance requirements may deter some companies from seeking
capital through Reg. CF financing methods).
6
Id., at 40–41.
7
Id., at 39 (arguing that crowdfunding at these costs is a “dismal idea”). See also Jack Wroldsen,
Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 551 (2017) (discussing inherent risks of
crowdfunding investments, including “inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up
companies,” sophistication of ordinary investors; and fraud running rampant).
8
See Lee, supra note 5, at 70.
9
Id., at 64–67.
10
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Selling Crowdfunded Equity: A New Frontier, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 189, 192
(2017); However, Professor Heminway further points out “that not every crowdfunded offering of a profit-sharing
instrument or interest is equity crowdfunding.” Id. at 194. See also, Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All
Regulated but Not Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 359, 362 (2015).
11
Andrew Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885, 889 (2018). The
terminology “securities crowdfunding” is a good descriptor, except that the term, in my opinion, gives focus to the
securities and not the whole transaction, which conceivably is an investment from a shareholder’s perspective. The
use of the term “equity crowdfunding” appears limiting as companies can seek debt, convertible or equity
financing. The opposite concern surrounds using the term “securities crowdsourcing,” which implies a broader
context but is narrowed by putting “securities” in front of the broader term crowdsourcing.
12
Richard Epstein, The Political Economy of Crowdsourcing: Markets for Labor, Rewards, and Securities,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 35, 47 (2015).
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are offered under other 1933 Act exemptions or to international campaigns.

The term

investment crowdfunding is primarily used in this article regarding Reg. CF exemption
campaigns hosted in the United States.13
As the lion share of securities are offered under public offerings or Reg. D safe
harbor exemptions, outcomes and impacts of Reg. CF offerings are not studied or
monitored to the same extent. One line of inquiry is the scope of Reg. CF, including
questions about the level of company participation, the types of businesses seeking capital
formation, and the quality of the investments offered. This article seeks to answer to what extent
Reg. CF investment crowdfunding has facilitated company capital formation and provided a
means for investors to purchase suitable investments. Towards that end, the author retrieved
data from SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings completed by companies beginning
with Reg. CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018.14
In light of the research, the author makes several assertions. First, the progress of
investment crowdfunding is neither dismal, nor a resounding success, but more a mix of positive
and troubling developments. The data reviewed and retrieved provides positives regarding
participation, funding portal expansion, that some companies are raising capital. There has been
growth in the crowdfunding of Reg. CF securities, and in the sale of digital tokens based on
blockchain technology (also known as “distributed ledger technology,” or "DLT").15 Other
13

See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 889 (“Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United States, has
become a worldwide phenomenon, with New Zealand leading the charge.”); Anton Didenko, Regulating FinTech:
Lessons from Africa, 19 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 311, 313 (2018) (discussing crowdfunding in Kenya and South
Africa); Kim Wales, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A GUIDE TO THE NEW CAPITAL
MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND ENTREPRENEURS 218 (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018).
14
Edgar
Company
Filings,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/Companiesearch.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (company Form C,
C/A, C-U, C-W filings and registrations were retrieved and reviewed here); Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf, (last visited Sept. 16, 2018); With respect to company Reg. CF
offerings: Form C/W is the method to withdraw an offering; Form C/A is the method to amend an offering; Form
C/U is the filing to announce the success or failure of an offering after the closing date; Form C/W is the form to
withdraw the filing before the closing date. See also Constance Z. Wagner, Securities Fraud in Cyberspace:
Reaching the Outer Limits of the Federal Securities Law, 80 NEB. L. REV. 920, 924 (2013) (The SEC has allowed
Edgar Filings since 1984 to permit companies to electronically file disclosure documents under the 1933, 1934
Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940.)
15
See Kevin Werbach, Satoshi’s Solution, The Blockchain And The New Architecture Of Trust, (The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2018, Ch. 2, 49) stating that “Cryptocurrency enthusiasts envision digital tokens as being
widely accepted for all sorts of financial payments by people around the world, as credit cards are….). See also,
Jay G. Baris & Joshua A. Klayman, Blockchain Basics for Investment Managers: A Token of Appreciation, 51
The Review of Securities and Commodities Regulation: An Analysis of Current Laws and Regulations Affecting
the Securities and Future Industries 67, 68, March 21, 2018.
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troubling inferences of investment crowdfunding company offerings, generally, is that capital
raised pales in comparison to other alternative means to raise capital and more specifically, the
expansion of securities (i.e. digital tokens and coins) offered to investors has risks for both
investors and the companies.16 Reg. CF digital tokens offerings reliant on the blockchain raise
troubling concerns regarding the offering of complex, uncertain and speculative securities,
which raise questions regarding investor’s return on investment. Some companies have not
been successful with their digital token offerings, with cancelled offerings rather than capital
raised. The downside of growth in funding portals is that funding portals used in offerings17 are
typically located in limited parts of the country, with limited liability. Many areas of the country
are not participating in Reg. CF capital formation, whether that is in investment crowdfunding
generally, or digital token offerings specifically. Unless a company utilizes an alternative
means of financing, they may not have access to capital for their emerging enterprise. The
foregoing raising the question whether the goals of job creation and capital formation will be
met under the current regulatory scheme.
Insights from the research suggest that this topic is more nuanced than initially apparent,
because the larger market of initial coin offerings is represented by well publicized ICO
offerings which have the greatest volume of transactions when compared to Reg. CF digital
tokens.18 That being said, ICOs are being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).19 However,
Reg. CF blockchain-based offerings are not monitored in the same way since companies file
16

See infra Part II(C).
U.S. SEC, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers (April 5, 2017) (In
order to act as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6)
of the Securities Act, an organization is required to register – either as a broker-dealer under Section 15(b) of the
Exchange Act or as a funding portal pursuant to Section 4A(a)(1) of the Securities Act. These funding portals
register with the SEC on Form Funding Portal and can be a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, limited
liability company, or other organized entity acting as an intermediary in crowdfunding transactions). The funding
portal must also become a member of FINRA. See Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). See also Forms, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/forms (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (additional
information for registration, amendments, and withdrawal are set out in Instructions for Forms, available
at http://www.sec.gov/forms and
in
text
of
the
rules,
available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/secrulesregs.htm#sea34).
18
See infra Part II(C).
19
See Jonathan Rohr and Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the
Democratization of Public Capital Markets 41 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 338, 2017)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048104, at 5 (noting that “the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and its counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales”), with
permission.
17

5
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the required and periodic notices with the SEC including disclosure documents that include the
predictions of risk affiliated with the offerings.
To illustrate the findings, this article proceeds in five succeeding substantive parts:
PART II provides a brief history of the Reg. CF exemption law and the research findings
about investment crowdfunding, generally and digital tokens, more specifically;
PART III provides insights of the current state of offering blockchain based digital
tokens to unsophisticated investors and the silver linings in the data;
PART IV provides recommendations towards a path forward in Reg. CF. First, the SEC
should re-evaluate its regulatory policy in light of the proliferation of blockchain based token
offerings, gaps in funding portals and provide additional warnings to unsophisticated investors
who may be taking on enhanced investment risk. The uncertainty and risk of digital tokens
reliant on blockchain technology foretells a troubling high risk of investment loss, which may
be in addition to the expected high risk of loss for startup tech companies. Second, companies,
particularly idealistic tech startups, that are considering the offer of digital tokens, should
thoughtfully consider alternatives to these offerings. There remains a level of uncertainty and
risk in these offerings, which could result in greater risk and liability than the alternative
financing available to them. Last, economic development organizations should consider
developing their role in attracting, designing and implementing funding portals to provide the
support that tech and other startup companies need to raise capital for their business.
PART V provides concluding remarks.

PART II. REG. CF LAW AND DIGITAL TOKENS
A. Capital Formation
Historically, raising capital was a pathway for large, well established enterprises. One
way larger enterprises raised large amounts of capital was through traditional public offerings
of securities under the 1933 Act. Prior to Reg. CF, companies who sought to offer securities
had several options. First, they could register securities pursuant to the 1933 Act, which
provides a statutory framework for the federal regulation of securities offerings. Registration

|Page

6

Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019) [10-Dec-2018 11:50am

would be cost prohibitive for these smaller companies.20 Second, companies could seek one
of several safe harbor exemptions discussed further in this section. The other traditional way
of raising capital was pursuant to an exemption under the 1933 Act. Third, the company could
just avoid offering securities and consider a host of other funding alternatives.21
“Crowdfunding is the use of the internet or other means to raise money . . . in small
amounts from a large number of contributors to support a wide range of ideas and ventures.”22
Investment crowdfunding is the younger sibling of the crowdfunding of ideas, goods and
services offered to the public. Investment crowdfunding started with Title III of the Crowdfund
Act. This Act amended the 1933 Act and allowed companies23 to offer and sell up to one
million dollars of unregistered equity securities in a twelve-month period, without registering
them.24 The SEC raised the cap on exempted transactions to allow companies to raise $1.07
million in 2017.25 The normative goal of the Crowdfund Act was to encourage small business
growth and further employment, specifically to “help entrepreneurs raise the capital they
need to put Americans back to work and create an economy that’s built to last.”26 The
Crowdfund Act aimed to lower regulatory hurdles for companies trying to go public and
to allow firms to have more private shareholders. 27 The Crowdfund Act further promised
to provide issuers the ability to access investors via the Internet with the aid of funding portals.

20

15 U.S.C. § 77(f)(b) et. seq.
See generally Wales, supra note 13; see also, Lee, supra note 5, at 50–66.
22
RICHARD A. MANN & BARRY S. ROBERTS, ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
799 (Cengage, 13th ed., 2017); see also Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2014) (describing crowdfunding as a “financing method used primarily by
companies and small businesses to raise small amounts of capital from a large number of people over the Internet”).
See also, Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation,
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 477 n.1 (2014).
23
The Crowdfund Act would allow eligible, domestic, nonpublic issuers to raise up to $1.07 million as of
2017 (a figure that would be periodically adjusted for inflation) Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding Investment Limits
Increase, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 5, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alertsand-bulletins/ib_crowdfundingincrease
24
JOBS Act, at § 302.
25
In the first year, the SEC capped the investments at $1,000,000 and during raised the cap to $1,070,000
in 2017. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1)..
26
Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Companies (“JOBS”) Act,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-signjumpstart-our-business-Companies-jobs-act; see also Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1030 (discussing the goals of the
Crowdfund Act).
27
New York Stock Exchange, Regulation A+ (“REG A+”), https://www.nyse.com/regulation-a (last visited
on Sept. 6, 2018).
21

7

|Page

Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019) [10-Dec-2018 11:50am

Schwartz described the goals as a quest for efficiency, on the one hand, and a quest for
inclusiveness on the other.28
Offering securities without either a registration or under a safe harbor is illegal.
Therefore, registering securities or offering securities under an exemption would be necessary
to avoid violating Section 5 of the 1933 Act.29 Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the 1933 Act generally
prohibit any person, including broker-dealers, from using the mails or interstate means to sell
or offer to sell, either directly or indirectly, any security unless a registration statement is in
effect or has been filed with the Commission as to the offer and sale of such security, or an
exemption from the registration provisions applies.30 For this reason, companies seeking to
avoid complications under the securities laws would register or find an allowable safe harbor
exemption. The next section provides a brief overview of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s adoption of Reg. CF and the differences between the law and economic
requirements of Reg. CF filings from other 1933 Act safe harbor exemptions.31
1. What is Reg. CF?
The idea of offering securities in small amounts to a large number of participants is not
only novel, but is also becoming a disruptive financial technological innovation.

This

disruption is precipitated, in part, by the SEC’s implementation of the Crowdfund Act and, in
part, due to a variety of external factors. In a very nascent way, Reg. CF was a positive step
towards democratizing investment markets and decentralizing access to capital.32 In light of

28

See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 893.
See 1933 Securities Act, §§ 5(a), (c) (“Section 5 of the Securities Act requires all offers and sales of
securities in interstate commerce to be registered, unless an exemption from registration is available.”). SEC
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-broker-dealer-duty-section4.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018). For cases establishing a prima facia case, see, e.g., SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105,
121 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006); SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2004); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
30
See 1933 Securities Act, at §§ 5(a), (c).
31
This research does not include a discussion on intrastate offerings of securities.
32
Society’s ability to democratize and to decentralize access to capital is a question that scholars will research
in the upcoming years.
29
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the intersection of e-commerce and social media, scholars have considered such crowdfunding
moves to represent “populist, Internet-based finance.”33
Reg. CF are regulations that allow crowdfunding capital formation for small
undercapitalized companies. To that end, Reg. CF set forth structures, compliance
requirements, restrictions, responsibilities and costs to allow for smaller equity investments.
Reg. CF facilitates the raising of capital from the general public through the sale of securities,34
provides opportunities for companies35 to utilize internet funding portals, and helps to locate
members of the public willing to invest.36 The Crowdfund Act and the Reg. CF exemption
brought the promise of “a new, unregistered, wide-reaching brand of securities offering…that,
together with other changes in U.S. securities regulation, may become a new gateway to public
securities markets.”37
Through Reg. CF, U.S. companies that are not already Exchange Act Reporting
companies are allowed to raise up to $1.07 million in a twelve-month period; allow the
solicitation of their shares; and have the offering be exempt from SEC and state securities law
registration.38 Such measures have joined a host of other developments that have collectively
opened the floodgates of crowdfunding investment. For example, Congress has allowed
companies to raise money and offer shares to the general public, not just to accredited or
sophisticated investors.

33

See Heminway, supra note 10, at 193; see also, Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global
Significance of Crowdfunding: Solving the SME Funding Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM.
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 347, 357, 366 (2016) (“The rise of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—
websites generally associated with the emergence of Web 2.0—as well as the popular payment services site PayPal,
enabled crowdfunding to gain greater visibility.”).
34
See, e.g.,17 C.F.R. § 200.30-3 (2016); Parsont, supra note 22, at 282.
35
Of the 1,112 companies that filed Form C’s to register securities, four had principal offices outside of the
United States and those locations included: Armenia, Spain, Kenya and the UK. See infra Part II(C) and
accompanying data.
36
See infra Part II(C).
37
See Heminway, supra note 10, at 205; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2018) (explaining that “[s]ecurities crowdfunding is a new idea, modeled on the
recently introduced and highly successful concept of ‘reward’ crowdfunding, which is practiced on Kickstarter,
IndieGoGo, and other websites”).
38
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers
(May 13, 2016 (with Apr. 5, 2017 updates)), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide051316.htm.

9
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In addition to Reg. CF, Congress also approved Reg. A+ in the JOBS Act.39 In
furtherance of the goals, Reg. CF, Reg. A, and the amended Reg. A+, provided new
opportunities for small businesses to attract the financing they needed to run their businesses.40
The basic details about each regulation are briefly set forth below. Under the regulatory
regimes, the definition of “security” is based on the broadly worded provision of Section 2(a)(1)
of the 1933 Act, which states as follows:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
“security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.41
Effective June 2015, the SEC amended Reg. A and authorized Reg. A+ to allow a U.S.
or Canadian company two types of greater funding opportunities, set forth as either Tier 1
or Tier 2 offerings.42 For Tier 1 offerings, companies can raise up to $20 million in a 12month period, with no more than $6 million in offers by selling to security-holders that are
affiliates.43 For Tier 2, companies are allowed to raise up to $50 million in a twelve-month
period using a “public solicitation” of its shares, with no more than $15 million to affiliates,
and have the offering be exempt from SEC and state securities law registration. 44

39

17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015) (explaining the scope of the exemption).
Anzhela Knyazeva, Regulation A+: What Do We Know So Far?, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., at 2–7
(Nov. 2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf.
41
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
42
See Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 1–3 (Regulation A, amended June 19, 2015, provides an exemption from
registration for certain small issues).
43
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2015).
44
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015); see also Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 3 n.10.
40
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There are also basic requirements applicable to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings,
including company eligibility requirements, bad actor disqualification provisions, disclosure
requirements, and more.

Additional requirements apply to Tier 2 offerings, including

limitations on the amount of money a non-accredited investor may invest in a Tier 2 offering,
requirements for audited financial statements, and the filing of ongoing reports.45 Issuers of
Tier 2 offerings are not required to register or qualify their offerings with state securities
regulators. However, “resales of securities purchased in a Tier 2 offering that do not meet the
condition of one of the exemptions from state registration must be registered with state
securities regulators.”46
2. How Reg. CF differs from Other Exempt and Nonexempt Offerings
a. 1933 Act Offerings47

Reg. CF filings and 1933 Act offerings differ significantly. Other than involving the
same three discernable players—a company, a funding portal and an investor—there is not
much similarity between these methods of offering securities. Differences include transaction
structure/size, investment research availability, liquidity, market share, exchange systems and
the types of securities offered. First and foremost is the cost. In a 1933 Act public offering,
the costs start at $4.2 million dollars in offering costs directly attributable to the IPO, plus
underwriter fees equal to 4-7% of gross proceeds.48

45

Knyazeva, supra note 40, at 3 n.8.
Id. at 26 n.59 (citing SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2017)
(question 182.10).
47
Registration under the 1933 Act includes registering a set of documents, including a prospectus, which
are filed with the SEC before an entity goes public and quarterly and annual reports after the entity goes public.
See U.S. SEC, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). See also Alexander F.
Cohen, Financial Statement Requirements in US Securities Offerings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG., (Feb. 5, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/05/financial-statement-requirements-in-ussecurities-offerings/.
48
Considering an IPO to fuel your company’s future?, PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/library/cost-of-an-ipo.html (last visited at Sept. 20, 2018); see also
Jay Preston, Note, Initial Coin Offerings: Innovation, Democratization and the SEC, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
318, 328 (2018) (estimating between $4-28 million dollars).
46
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Pursuant to Reg. CF, for the first time, small investors are allowed to buy small dollar
amounts of unregistered securities from companies. The SEC’s threshold bifurcates investors
into two categories: Those who have more than $100,000 in income and those with less than
$100,000. The SEC further clarified that if both an investor's income and net worth are less than
$100,000, then the amount invested could not exceed $2,000 or five percent of their net worth
(whichever is greater).49 However, there is no floor to the income and net worth, with an issuer
relying on their funding portals to assess investor limits.50 The securities offered continue to
be of high risk with provisions that seemingly protect companies more so than the investors.
Reg. CF investors have a one-year restriction on the resale of Reg. CF or other restricted
stock from other safe harbor transactions. The reasonableness of these resale restrictions
continues to be debated. Legal scholars have argued that allowing companies to sell stock
through crowdfunding and mini-IPO’s is not enough—securities regulations must allow
investors to resell that stock.51 Oranburg makes three arguments to support the view that more
liquidity is fundamental to meet the normative goals of crowdfunding. First, investors are
discouraged from investing because they do not have a way to liquidate their stock easily in a
resale market. Second, capital continues to be consolidated in more mature companies instead
of young organizations. Third, wealthy and influential investors can resell large blocks of stock
and can do so in secret trading environments.52 The liquidity is also problematic for investors,
as there may not be a ready and available market for their newly purchased security. Oranburg’s
solution is to call for a “144B” venture-exchange safe harbor, in addition to the “144A” venture
transactions on the OTC markets.53
Also, a resale exchange for Reg. CF investment crowdfunding transactions does not
currently exist. For example, an investor holding less than $100 can buy publicly offered 1933
49

See Dibadj, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that the SEC “bifurcates investors into two categories: those whose
annual income or net worth is less than $100,000 and those whose annual income or net worth is at or above that
amount…”).
50
Id. at 24 (noting that the issuer may rely on the intermediary to assess these limits.)
51
See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016. See also, Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399 (1998).
52
See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1015–1016. Oranburg defines dark-pool markets as trading markets
available and known to very few investors and further notes that these dark-pool markets are “private stock markets
that are not accessible by the general investing public.” Id. at 1047.
53
Id. at 1055–1057 (noting curiosity surrounding why “the SEC has not already acted to create a domestic
venture exchange”).
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Act securities and then trade the stock freely on their own or through a registered
broker/dealer.54 Securities can also be bought under Reg. CF, but resale is not readily available.
To solve the resale and liquidity problems, lawmakers have presented two promising bills that
passed the U.S. House of Representatives. The first bill is the Main Street Growth Act.55 The
Main Street Growth Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to allow for the
registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide a venue that is tailored to the needs
of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one venue in which their
securities can trade.56 A second bill is the Crowdfunding Amendments Act. This bill would
allow crowdfunding investors to pool their money together into a fund that is advised by a
registered investment advisor.57
In 1933 Act offerings, traditional offerings have included common stock, preferred
stock and debt instruments. However, in Reg. CF offerings, securities offerings can include
standard equity, debt, revenue participations, and a variety of investment contracts,58 that
funding portals have developed and promoted for a company’s use.59 Companies have begun
to offer more complex investment contracts, such as the SAFE -- simple agreement for future

54

For members of the public, stocks on NYSE and NASDAQ can be purchased at small dollar amounts
with brokerage fees as low as $5.95. Online Broker Partners, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/online-brokers/
(last visited at Oct. 23, 2018); see also NYSE Exchange Fees,
https://www.interactivebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=934 (last visited at Oct. 23, 2018). see also,
https://www.tdameritrade.com/pricing.page (stock trades at $6.95 over the internet).
55
Main Street Growth Act is sponsored by Rep. Tom Emmer (R-MN). H.R. 5877 - Main Street Growth
Act, 115th Cong. (2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5877/actions
(last visited Nov. 14, 2018). H.R. 5877 was introduced on May 18, 2018 and passed the House on July 10, 2018.
Id. On July 11, 2018, the bill was received in the Senate and read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. Id. It would allow for the registration of venture exchanges with the SEC to provide
a venue that is tailored to the needs of small and emerging companies and offers qualifying companies one venue
in which their securities can trade. Id.
56
Id.
57
H.R. 6380 - Crowdfunding Amendments Act, 115th Cong. (2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
HTTPS://WWW.CONGRESS.GOV/BILL/115TH-CONGRESS/HOUSE-BILL/6380 (LAST VISITED NOV. 14,, 2018). H.R.
6380 introduced in the House on July 16, 2018 and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services on July
16, 2018. Id.
58
Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 589 (Wroldsen identified two new forms of simplified contracts, the "SAFE"
and the 'KISS," securities specially tailored for crowdfunding investment offerings with high-growth potential.
These securities hold great promise, though not without drawbacks. Wroldsen developed an understanding of the
taxonomy, terms and variations in crowdfunding investment contracts, illustrating a baseline, standardized
investment contract, as well as two the emerging SAFE and KISS.); See also, Joseph M. Green, Crowdfunding
and the Not-So-Safe Safe, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 170-175 (2016).
59
Id., at 546.
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equity, the KISS, -- keep it simple security, and contractual revenue sharing agreements.60
SAFEs are not debt instruments, but rather future equity instruments, whereby shareholders
have no voting or shareholder rights, and no lender rights or priorities.61 The KISS, on the other
hand, is a debt instrument that offers convertible securities (equity or debt) with favorable terms
(e.g. significant investor rights, protections, and preferences upon conversion into equity).62
The research findings demonstrate the continuation of SAFE investment contract security
offerings.63
Under Reg. CF, there has been a growth in the number of investment contracts known
as the simple agreement for future token (“SAFT”) -- an investment contract between a
purchaser and seller that promises the delivery of digital tokens or another equity/debt
instruments in the future,64 conditionally or unconditionally.65 SAFT and their corollary future
digital tokens expanded in Reg. CF offerings between November of 2017 through June 30,
2018.66 “The distinctive feature of the SAFT is that it splits the promise of future tokens from
the distribution of operational tokens.”67
In 2016, Professor Joseph Green evaluated investment contracts offered under Reg. CF
and found that the SAFEs were not so “safe” or appropriate investments, as many of the
companies would not actually be able to raise venture capital funding.68 At this time, the typical

60

Id. at 582; see also Giorgia Coltella, SAFE vs. KISS, the evolution of the convertible note, MEDIUM (Sept.
19, 2017), https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vs-kiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d.
61
Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 573.
62
Id. at 570–71.
63
As of June 2018, outside of common stock transactions, SAFEs were the number one type of security
offered by two of the top five largest funding portals.
64
Pete Martin, What the Cardozo report gets right and wrong about SAFT’s approach to ICO self-regulation,
MEDIUM (DEC. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/votem/what-the-cardozo-report-gets-right-and-wrong-about-saftsapproach-to-ico-self-regulation-3bf7fbcc7be5 (citing the CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT RESEARCH REPORT #1,
NOT SO FAST – RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF A “SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES (Nov. 21, 2017)). See also, Averie
Brookes, U.S. Regulation of Blockchain Currencies: A Policy Overview, 9 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 75, 102
(2018) (noting a company’s use of a SAFT to launch its token sale and later developed a working model for selfregulation).
65
See infra Part II(C).
66
See infra Part II(C).
67
See Werbach, supra note 15, Connecting the Legal and the Technical, Ch. 10, at 207 and noting that
(The initial transaction is typically handled under SEC Regulation D or Regulation Crowdfunding, two of the
exceptions to the registration requirements for securities offerings.).
68
See Green, supra note 58, at 170, 174 (Green warns that “the nomenclature ‘SAFE’ may actually be
somewhat misleading” and that “[t]he safety implied by the clever acronym ‘SAFE’ actually points to the
instrument’s safety for the issuing company—which is able to avoid the maturity dates associated with convertible
notes—rather than any safety for the investor.”).
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SAFE was a security developed by a Silicon Valley company accelerator named Y Combinator
for companies expecting to raise institutional venture capital funding at a later date.69 Time
will tell whether they will be suitable investments for investors. Reg. CF offerings are occurring
within a broader context of advancements in distributed ledger technology,70 which present new
opportunities and challenges for companies in their quest to raise capital, and offer complexity
for the investing public and regulators.71
As far as similarities between Reg. CF offerings and 1933 Act offerings go, both have
notice requirements and companies are subject to liability under Reg. CF investment
crowdfunding. Securities may be sold to any member of the public in small amounts, but with
a smaller cap of $1.07 million for Reg. CF companies, compared to offerings in other safe
harbor exemptions. Second, neither purchase requires that the investor be sophisticated or
accredited like other exempt filings require. Third, investors can lose their money from buying
shares and other investment instruments from a company registered under the 1933 Act,
possibly as easily as they might under Reg. CF. This means that for both the 1933 Act publicly
offered securities and investment crowdfunding: 1) Securities are available publicly; 2)
Investors need not be sophisticated or accredited investors before purchase; and 3) Investors
can risk the loss of their investment. Both offerings must be mindful not to violate Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”).72 Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act makes it unlawful to "use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors."73 Rule 10(b)(5) makes it unlawful “to make any untrue

69

See id., at 171.
The technological phase relates to the new cryptocurrency heights that have recently been accomplished.
First, there has been success in raising small dollar amounts via Reg. CF to serve as a first step before a second
round of funding. Second, there have been successful ICO’s, Reg. D and Reg A+ are raising significant dollars in
cryptocurrency, despite recent legal travails, fraud and hacking. Third, the development of Blockchain and
complimentary exchanges tie in to the future trading of Reg. CF tokens.
71
See Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 551 (discussing inherent risks of crowdfunding investments, including
inherent uncertainty and high likelihood of failure of early-stage start-up companies; sophistication of ordinary
investors; and fraud running rampant)
72
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
73
Id.; e.g., In Morris v. Overstock.com, the company was sued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for
misrepresentations or omissions made to shareholders on their intent to engage in an initial coin offering. No. 18cv-00271, at *2–*3 (D. Utah Mar. 29, 2018),
70
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statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading,” as well as other manipulative and deceptive activities.74
b. Exempt Offerings
From the perspectives of both companies and investors, complying with securities laws
is wrought with complexity. From a company’s perspective, after the entity has decided to raise
capital, they must determine whether they want to issue common or preferred stock, debt, or
possibly an investment contract. Once that decision is made, there is a need to determine which
exemption is best to proceed with if they do want to sell a security. Not discussed in this Article
is the possibility of filing an intrastate security offering. Many states have passed their own
state-level crowdfunding exemptions, which exempt small business intrastate crowdfunding
from federal securities registration.75 As of 2016, the majority of intrastate crowdfunding
provisions required a notice filing with a state regulator.76 However, there are unrealistic
limitations of selling only to in-state investors. While there may be a variety of exemptions
available, there may be only one viable choice.
There are many differences between Reg. CF offerings and other exempt filings.77 For
example, Reg. D offerings under the 1933 Act allow two exemptions from Section 5 registration
requirements under Rules 50478 and 506.79 These offerings are considered private offerings

74

17 C.F.R § 240.10b(5).
Evan Glustrom, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security In Following The Crowd?, 34
ALASKA L. R. 293, 308 (2017) (noting that “[t]hese state-level regulations completely exempt intrastate
crowdfunding from SEC regulation so long as the issuer is organized in the state and all investors reside in the
state”).
76
See Final Rules: Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, at 62 n. 218 (Oct.
26, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10238.pdf. E.g., Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and the District of Columbia. Other states
have pending legislation that would require notice filings for intrastate crowdfunded offerings, e.g., California,
Hawaii, Missouri, Nevada, and New Hampshire.
77
The Commission amended Rule 504, effective January 20, 2017. Id, at 76-82. It also repealed Rule 50,
effective May 22, 2017. Id. at 82-86. Finally, the Commission adopted new rule 147A as a safe harbor to the
Section 3(a)(11) exemption, effective April 20, 2017. Id. at 16.
78
17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (2017).
79
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2013).
75
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and have different restrictions than a public offering. Reg. D offerings, which can only be made
to accredited sophisticated investors, can be resold under Rules 144 and 144A with volume
restrictions.80 But, resale restrictions continue for non-accredited investors. 81
There are additional restrictions and limitations on Reg. D safe harbor exemptions. In
Rule 504 offerings, issuers are limited to offering up to $5 million dollars in securities in a
twelve-month period, provided that the offerings are consistent with the public interest, and
certain bad actors are disqualified from participation.82 “Rule 504 currently permits the resale
of securities issued in Rule 504 offerings that involve general solicitation or advertising where
either the offering is registered in one or more states and one or more states require the
dissemination of a state-approved disclosure document or the offering is exempt but sales are
only made to accredited investors.”83 “Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and limits
sales to no more than 35 non-accredited investors” whereas Rule 506(c) allows general
solicitation to an unlimited number of accredited investors.84 In the next section, some
additional background is provided about the emergence of crowdfunding and other available
exemptions and safe harbors operative during the new investment crowdfunding era. Under
506(c), companies may sell to an unlimited number of accredited investors, but cannot solicit
investors.85
Outside of the costs and limitations trading, theoretically, there is no reason that
Reg. CF offerings could not succeed and serve as an extremely positive force. Positive
outcomes could realize democratized company offerings,86 lower crowdfunding transaction

80

See Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1026–27.
Id., at 1025.
82
See Rohr and Wright, supra note 19, at 75.
83
Final Rules: Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, at 82 (Oct. 26, 2016)
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10238.pdf.
84
Id., at 86; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2013) (“Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor
either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment[.]”).
85
See Preston, supra note 48, at 326.
86
See Pekmezovic, supra note 33, at 347 (arguing that equity crowdfunding “enhances access to capital for
SMEs globally while simultaneously democratizing access to investments for ordinary citizens”); see also
Oranburg, supra note 4, at 1029–31 (discussing the JOBS Act’s potential to achieve purported goals of
democratizing access to capital, creating jobs, and growing the innovation economy).
81
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costs,87 increasing shareholder choice and funding portal inclusivity and efficiency.88
However, a flood of speculative, risky and uncertain securities, may hinder positive
outcomes. The worst case is that the macro benefits of this particular safe harbor is
hijacked. Hijacking may be a strong term to use, however, to the extent that a flood of
largely unregulated and potentially volatile securities,89 securities fraud risk90 or unfettered
exuberance, the goals of the Crowdfund Act may not be realized.
3. Reg. CF Offerings and the Sale of Digital Tokens
The issuance of digital tokens reliant on blockchain technology is one of those explosive
developments in capital fundraising campaigns.91 Most of this activity is happening in the IPO
markets, but some of the activity is occurring in Reg. CF offerings. The developments have
skeptics and proponents. On the one hand billionaire investor, Warren Buffett say, "Stay away
from it. It's a mirage.”92 Meanwhile, former U.S. CFTC Chairman, Gary Gensler states that
“blockchain technology….underlying bitcoin has a real chance to be a catalyst for change in
the world of finance, and that’s because it moves data and it also applies computer code against
a decentralized network.”93

87

See Lee, supra note 5, at 68–69 and accompanying text.
See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 912 (theorizing that securities crowdfunding campaigns have a tension
between inclusiveness and efficiency: “[t]he SEC concluded, again, probably correctly, that some level of
exclusivity is needed for crowdfunding to work; total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function”).
89
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution from Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35 (2017) (advocating four approaches regarding how to properly regulate
FinTech, which include: “doing nothing;” “cautious permissiveness through flexibility and forbearance;”
“restricted experimentation;” “and regulatory development”).
90
In the midst of SEC’s adoption of Reg. CF, scholars wrote about investor protection, securities fraud, and
finding ways to balance what was perceived as an opening for widespread theft of investor’s contributions. See
Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 606–07 (2015); Dibadj,
supra note 4, at 31, 39–44; Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn, The New
Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2012).
91
See Rohr, supra note 19, at 1.
92
Mitch Tuchman, Heed Warren Buffett’s warning: Bitcoin is pure FOMO, Cryptocurrency mania rests on
greater fools, February 10, 2018, adding that “The idea that it has some huge intrinsic value is just a joke, in my
view."
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heed-warren-buffetts-warning-bitcoin-is-pure-fomo-2017-12-26
(Last retrieved on December 7, 2018).
93
Dave Liedtka, Cryptocurrencies, Most Tokens From ICOS Are Securities, Former CFTC Head Says,
Bloomberg (October 15, 2018) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-15/most-tokens-from-icosare-securities-former-cftc-head-says (Last retrieved on December 8, 2018).
88
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To understand these assets and securities, descriptions of the terms tokens, crypto
tokens, cryptocurrency, and blockchain ledger technology are briefly described below. The
definition of the word token has a recently been revised to: “a piece resembling a coin issued
for use . . . by a particular group on specified terms”, “issued as money by some person or body
other than a de jure government,” or “as a unit of cryptocurrency.”94 Historically, the word
token represented a tangible item, such as a bus token or a game token. Practitioners and
scholars, classify tokens as “digital tokens,” with a unit of value tied to a blockchain ledger.95
The token’s “virtual” or “digitized” characteristic evokes the colloquial term “crypto token,” a
term used by the tech industry to describe virtual currencies or digital assets tied to the
blockchain,96 and recently by courts and the SEC as “cryptocurrency ‘tokens’ or ‘coins.’ ”97
Digital tokens can be a reward, combining functional and consumptive elements and also can
be fundamental to a blockchain network.98 Tokens can be purchased either with cash or by
using other coins.99 Tokens are also potentially tradeable and transferable through an exchange
for another coin or an item of value.100 Recently, the IRS has ruled that digital tokens will be
treated as property for federal income tax purposes.101
The SEC mandates that funding portals host a company’s offering to investors. To
visualize the role of the funding portal, using Werbach’s square surrounded by six circles is

94

Token, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/token (last visited Sept. 15,
2018). Cyptocurrency is defined as “any form of currency that only exists digitally, that usually has no
central issuing or regulating authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record transactions
and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and
fraudulent transactions”). See also Cryptocurrency MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
95
Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 70. Baris and Klayman describe digital tokens as representing a unit
of value, which may make them look more like commodities (“There is tremendous flexibility in how to structure
digital tokens and what those digital tokens may represent.”). Id. Nathan Dudgeon and Gareth Malna, Distributed
Ledger Technology: From Blockchain to ICOS, 37 Banking & Fin. Services Pol’y Rep. 4, 41 (February 2018) (“A
blockchain facilitates online transactions by acting as a secure, digitized, decentralized, public ledger.”).
96
Michael Patterson, Crypto’s 80% Plunge is Now Worse Than the Dot-Com Crash, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 12,
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-12/crypto-s-crash-just-surpassed-dot-com-levels-aslosses-reach-80.
97
United States v. Maksim Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2018).
98
Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 75 n.47.
99
See Zaslavskiy, supra note 97, at *5 (noting the type of currency, such as bitcoin or ether, that can purchase
an app token); see also infra Part II(C).
100
See infra Part II(C).
101
Notice, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (2014)
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helpful. An intermediary is a central player in the offering and provides a role between the
company and the investor, as follows:
Graphic of an Intermediary’s Role102

Examples of large enterprises utilizing intermediary models are Amazon and eBay,
Uber and Airbnb, where the consumer goes to their respective platform selling the items of a
third party business. This intermediary model for funding portals was adopted the SEC, but it
may provide a false sense of security for investors, as the funding portal has limited liability
and the funding portal isn’t designing the disclosure language included in the offering by the
companies. What is more ironic about centralizing the intermediary funding portal function is
that for digital tokens, what is offered would be quite a different type of securities model, not
centralized at all because the security is reliant on the development of the blockchain network.
Werbach illustrates how a blockchain network operates, which he describes as one
where “nothing is assumed to be trustworthy….except the output of the network itself….and
defines the landscape for the interactions with law, regulation, and governance.”103 The
blockchain based digital token could be illustrated as the future potential of a peer to peer
network, flowing as follows:

102

See Werbach, supra note 15, Ch. 1, The Trust Challenge, at 25-27 wherein he described an “Intermediary”
as one connoted by the box as a “trust architecture,” with the intermediary taking “the place of social norms and
government-issued laws to structure transactions.” Id. at 28
103
See id.
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Graphic of a Blockchain network104

It may be a minor point, but it is unclear the real value of the funding portals, outside of
centralizing an activity that will inevitably become decentralized, in its best case.
Why would a company use these blockchain based digital tokens? This method allows
a business to create its own digital assets for sale to the public—similar to an initial public
offering.105 These digital tokens are developed to reside on an issuing company’s own
blockchain and can represent an asset or a utility, 106 a right to services and other goods, as well
as a variety of other uses.107 Some companies are offering digital tokens because they seek to
become a dominant competitive player in this developing innovation. Furthermore, blockchain
based token offerings sold to Reg. CF investors are occasionally a testing ground for future
initial coin offerings.108

104

See id.
See Dudgeon and Malna, supra note 95, at 6 (providing a definition and an explanation why ICOs are so
popular globally).
106
See infra Part II(C).
107
See Rohr and Wright supra note 19, where they provide distinctions in different types of tokens reliant on
blockchain technology: e.g. utility tokens, “which have both consumptive and speculative characteristics;”
protocol tokens, which are tokens used “to compensate parties for participation in some activity that contributes
to the blockchain and network” e.g. a token to the person(s) that validate cryptographic hash for a block; and app
tokens which are “created by deploying a smart contract program on the Ethereum network.” Id. at 9, 14, 15, and
20.
108
Michael R. Meadows, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: Reconciling Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial
Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 272, 273 (2018) (Meadows article focused principally on ICOs as a
method of crowdfunding noting that “[w]hile ICOs serve as an effective method of raising capital, cryptocrowdfunding may repackage traditional crowdfunding models that would otherwise trigger federal securities
laws”). In their own right, initial coin offerings are a crowdfunding method used by companies to raise capital
selling a digital asset (e.g. digital token) that utilize blockchain technology.
105
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1. Digital Token Regulatory Controversy
Scholars argue that there are three categories of regulatory controversy: illegality,
validity, and classification regarding the broader category called “cryptocurrency.”109 There are
overlapping jurisdictions amongst federal regulators regarding the regulation of digital tokens,
from the CFTC, the SEC, the Treasury Department, the Department of Justice and the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”).110 One court has stated that the CFTC has concurrent jurisdiction
with the SEC over the future of digital currencies.111

Recently, the SEC found that

cryptocurrencies issued for the purpose of raising funds are securities and thus subject to
securities laws.112 The SEC has also set up a new cyber security division which is issuing alerts
for investors of coin offerings.113 The IRS continues with its exclusive jurisdiction over
taxation of tokens and to the extent that a crime has been committed, the Department of Justice
may intervene. Thus, to better understand the legality of the various questions, companies need
to be counseled wisely about the laws of a variety of agency considerations.
With respect to classification, the current regulatory framework for digital tokens and
cryptocurrencies has been described as a “fragmented, overlapping, and complex regulatory

109

Werbach, supra note 15, Ch. 9, We’re From the Government and We’re Here to Help, at 178.
Jai R. Massari et al., The Fragmented Regulatory Landscape for Digital Tokens, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
(Mar.
26,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/26/the-fragmented-regulatory-landscape-for-digital-tokens/; see also
CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (entering a Preliminary Injunction Order against
Defendants Patrick K. McDonnell and CabbageTech, Corp. d/b/a Coin Drop Markets (“CDM”) and affirming the
CFTC’s January 18, 2018 complaint charging defendants with fraud and misappropriation in connection with
purchases and trading of the virtual currencies Bitcoin and LiteCoin).
111
McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 230 (affirming that CFTC has standing to exercise its enforcement power
over fraud related to virtual currencies sold in interstate commerce and granting a preliminary injunction in favor
of the CFTC).
112
Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational Issues and Best
Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS & FIN. 112, 116 n. 10 (2018); see also
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PUB. NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
21(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 1 (2017) “THE 21 REPORT.”
113
Press Release, S.E.C., Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims (Aug. 28, 2017)
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alert-public-companiesmaking-ico-related (last visited on August 19, 2018). The SEC's Office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued
an Investor Alert in August 2017 warning investors about scams of companies claiming to be engaging in initial
coin offerings (ICO’s).
110
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landscape.”114 treated as property for federal income tax purposes.115 Some argue that the use
of a SAFT for the purchase of "pre-functional" tokens delivers a "functional" token that
ultimately is not a security.116 Others argue the use of a SAFT likely muddies the analysis of
whether a utility token is a security for purposes of U.S. federal securities law.117
According to a recent SEC report, designated as the “21(a) Report,” the SEC applied
longstanding securities law principles to demonstrate that a token constituted an investment
contract, and therefore, was a security under U.S. federal securities laws.118 The SEC
concluded that this DAO digital token offering represented an investment of money in a
common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.119 It also noted that merely calling a token a
“utility” token or structuring it to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a
security.120

Applying the Howey test,121 the SEC argued that tokens and offerings that

incorporate features and marketing efforts that emphasize the potential for profits based on the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security
under U.S. law.122
However, while companies issue digital tokens under the safe harbor, it is not settled,
the role of SEC’s ability to regulate in this market. SEC Chair Mary Jo White distinguished
114

Massari et al., supra note 110; see also Michael R. Meadows, Note, The Evolution of Crowdfunding:
Reconciling Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 272, 272–73
(2018). Meadows’ article focuses principally on ICOs as a method of crowdfunding. However, Meadows notes
the “unique issues crypto-crowdfunding poses to participating consumers and regulatory authorities” and “with
the emergence of blockchain technology, which adds an additional layer of complexity in determining whether
federal securities laws apply to a crowdfunding campaign.” Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
115
Notice, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (2014)
116
Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 10
117
Id.
118
THE 21 REPORT, SUPRA NOTE 112, at 15 (2017). See also Preston, supra note 48, at 322 (The Howey test
can be refined to four factors to consider an investment contract a security: 1) “[i]t is an investment of money; 2)
[t]he investment of money is in a common enterprise; 3) [a]ny profit comes from the efforts of a promotor or third
party; and 4) [t]here is an expectation of profits from the investment.”).
119
Id., at 17–18 (2017).
120
Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Public Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (last visited on October 5,
2018)
121
SEC v. W.J. Howey Company, 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
122
Clayton, supra note 120, (“On this and other points where the application of expertise and judgment is
expected, I believe that gatekeepers and others, including securities lawyers, accountants and consultants, need to
focus on their responsibilities. I urge you to be guided by the principal motivation for our registration, offering
process and disclosure requirements: investor protection and, in particular, the protection of our Main Street
investors.”).
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virtual currencies as not necessarily being a security, she also stated that interest and returns
could be subject to securities regulation.123 In some respects, this topic is more multifarious
than it would initially appear, because well publicized ICO offerings make up a much greater
portion of initial coin offerings than do Reg. CF digital tokens.124 That being said, ICOs are
being closely monitored by the SEC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”),
and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).125 Reg. CF blockchain-based offerings on the
other hand, are not monitored in the same way since companies file the required and periodic
notices with the SEC including disclosure documents that include the predictions of risk
affiliated with the offerings.
The method by which digital tokens are offered and sold to investors varies in that the
offerings “can take many different forms, and the rights and interests a coin is purported to
provide the holder can vary.”126 Digital tokens have been offered to purchasers outside of the
U.S. under Regulation S as long as the tokens do not flow back to the United States.127 The
digital tokens can be registered, offered, and sold to shareholders under Rule 144128 of the 1933
Act or under a safe harbor exemption (e.g. Reg. A, A+, Reg. D) as long as the company
complies with the requirements of these alternatives.
Since Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies—have offered over six hundred
million dollars of securities to investors under Reg. CF.129 These amounts represent a sizable
expansion in investment crowdfunding under these agency rules and rebuts the notion that few
would use the exemption.130 A part of that growth is attributed to the surprising development
of Reg. CF “digital token” or “blockchain based token” offerings, which represent a newer type
123
Nicolas Wenker, Online Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise Bitcoin, 19
Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 145, 180 (2014); See also Mark T. Williams, Beware of Bitcoin, Cognoscenti (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2013/12/05/bitcoin-currency-mark-t-williams (last retrieved on December 9,
2018)
124
See infra Part II(C).
125
See Rohr, supra note 19, at 5 (noting that “the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) and its
counterparts in other jurisdictions have turned their attention to token sales”).
126
Clayton, supra note 120.
127
See Rohr, supra note 19, at 83 n. 219 (referencing Regulation S, 17 CFR Section 230.904 for offshore
filings), with permission.
128
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2012).
129
Details about the companies and total amounts raised in investment crowdfunding campaigns are
discussed infra Part II(C). The total offerings do not include any amounts offered or raised in initial coin offerings
(“ICO’s”) nor any amounts raised under other available securities exemptions, such as Regulation A+ or
Regulation D. Also, this figure does not represent success or failure in amounts actually raised under the campaign.
130
Of the 1,112 filings, several duplications were removed from the data.
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of investment contracts distinguishable and seemingly more complex than prior investment
contracts offered under Reg. CF. These type of token offerings are proliferating and being sold
to investors and they are growing at a greater pace than traditional investment crowdfunding
securities offerings. If the growth continues at this pace, these Reg. CF digital tokens will
expand the type and quality of securities historically offered to investors.
Digital tokens are being offered and sold through both investment contracts under Reg.
CF131 and registered ICOs digital tokens.132 ICOs represent a significant number of the tokens
sold outside of Reg. CF digital tokens. However, digital tokens are also being offered and sold
without registration, a method which is subject to enhanced scrutiny by the SEC and other state
securities enforcement agencies.133
Digital tokens are a more recent development in capital formation. 134 These offerings
present yet another difference between crowdfunding and 1933 Act registered offerings. On
the one hand, these digital token offerings are a novel and innovative solution for company
capital formation that appears to be intriguing members of the public. In the short term,
companies are beginning to raise money to launch their companies, advance the business’
mission, and satisfy the crowd’s healthy appetite to invest.

In that respect, investment

131

See infra Part II(C).
Not to be confused with registered initial coin offerings, digital tokens offered under Reg. CF are offered
and sold in transactions exempt from federal securities laws governing the registration of securities offerings.
There are a variety of securities laws that still apply to Reg. CF filings, including disclosures about the companies,
insider trading, and limitations on the transactions allowed (e.g. amount offered by the issuer is under $1,070,000
in any twelve-month period and small dollar amounts sold to investors). Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity
Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n (May 13, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#_ftn1. This article seeks to address the
scope and effect of token offering campaigns on companies and their investors and to provide recommendations
as to how regulators may want to rethink Reg. CF investment crowdfunding in light of developments in Reg. CF
token offerings.
133
Brian Fung, State Regulators Unveil Nationwide Crackdown On Suspicious Cryptocurrency Investment
Schemes, WASHINGTON POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/05/21/state-regulators-unveil-nationwide-crackdown-on-suspicious-cryptocurrency-investmentschemes/?utm_term=.e342d426441b (“Securities regulators across the United States and Canada announced
dozens of investigations . . . into potentially deceitful cryptocurrency investment products, the largest
coordinated crackdown to date by state and provincial officials on bitcoin scams . . . The state agencies are also
pursuing suspicious cases of initial coin offerings, or ICOs, a fundraising technique used by both legitimate and
illegitimate cryptocurrency projects in ways that resemble initial public offerings of stock.”).
134
See infra Part II(C); see also Knyazeva, supra note 40 (regarding Reg. A financing: states that as of
October 31, 2016, prospective issuers had publicly filed offering statements for 147 Reg A+ offerings, for $2.6
billion in financing). Of the exempt filings, Reg. D offerings for 2016 had 23,292 offerings totaling over $2 Trillion
dollars. See Jonathan Nieh, Update on Regulation D: Data from 2016 Form D’s, CROWDFUND INSIDER (April 19,
2017), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/04/97876-update-regulation-d-data-2016-form-ds/.
132
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crowdfunding via Reg. CF shows promising signs of being an innovative bridge towards the
goal of capital formation. However, if issuing a token was as simple as providing a consumer
good to an interested buyer, the story would be over. The coins might be located next to a
comic book or beanie baby collection and no-one would care. However, there is a variety to
the characteristics of digital tokens. A digital token could be a functional utility used to
consume a product or service, as an investment security with possible growth potential, or as a
commodity like gold or silver.135
It is important to note a few distinctions in ICO digital tokens and Reg. CF blockchain
based tokens. To put the two in perspective, one should first understand the varying volumes
of the offering activity over the past few years. First, Rohr and Wright reported that in 2016,
less than $100 million in ICO digital tokens were sold, but by October 2017, that number grew
to over $3.7 billion.136 Current estimates show that by March 2018, ICO digital tokens
continued to grow rapidly to $11.3 billion dollars, with a single, $1.7 billion transaction by a
company named Telegram.137 However, the top 100 cryptocurrencies sold globally have a
market capitalization of over $208 billion, with BITCOIN having a market capitalization of
$112.7 billion in September 2018138 and down to $58 billion by December 6, 2018.139
Growing rapidly but at a lesser magnitude than ICO digital tokens, are Reg. CF digital
tokens, didn’t begin selling at all until the Fall of 2017.140 The offerings then grew to $22
million between November 2017 and the end of June 30, 2018.141 Relatively speaking, there is
no real comparison with the global explosion that has taken place between ICO digital tokens
and Reg. CF digital tokens. Reg. CF digital tokens are a small, but growing part of the token

135

See infra Part II(C).
See Rohr, supra note 19, at 4.
137
David Floyd, $6.3 Billion: 2018 ICO Funding Has Passed 2017's Total, COINDESK (April 19, 2018),
https://www.coindesk.com/6-3-billion-2018-ico-funding-already-outpaced-2017/ (noting that in just the first
quarter of 2018, $6.3 billion dollars of ICO digital tokens were raised, representing 118% of the 2017 total of $5
billion.).
138
COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited on Sept. 6, 2018). But cf., Kyle Torpey,
Comparing Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies by ‘Market Cap’ Can Be Very Misleading, FORBES (Dec. 29,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ktorpey/2017/12/29/comparing-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies-bymarket-cap-can-be-very-misleading/#62cbdb832509 (“Many cryptocurrency traders track the price of these digital
assets on sites like CoinMarketCap.com, but the key metric that is most often used to compare these
cryptocurrencies, market cap, can sometimes be misleading.”).
139
See, Finance.yahoo.com BTC-USD – Bitcoin USD (last retrieved on December 6, 2018).
140
See infra Part II(C).
141
See infra Part II(C).
136
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expansion. However, what distinguishes these offerings is that the Reg. CF investors are
members of the public, not necessarily sophisticated investors.
To determine whether digital tokens offered under Reg. CF are investment contracts
and thus, potentially a security, one would look to the Howey standard.142 Under the Howey
standard, whether there is an "investment contract" under the Securities Act depends on
“whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others”; “[i]f that test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the
enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without
intrinsic value.”143
Multiple federal and state agencies are pondering just how digital tokens should be
classified and the extent to which agencies should regulate them or not. Historically, the 1933
Act creates private rights of action to aid the enforcement of obligations pertaining to securities
offerings.144 Towards that end, the SEC has recently appointed Valerie A. Szczepanik to the
SEC Division of Corporation Finance with oversight of the securities laws and digital asset
technologies.145 Additionally, “[t]he Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . which regulates not
the original issuance of securities but all their subsequent trading, is[]enforceable through
private rights of action.”146

The SEC is currently monitoring digital tokens as possible

securities within the larger category of digital assets.147 “Digital tokens . . . can represent units
of value, which may make them look more like commodities.”148
Digital tokens have been distinguished from currency, “the coin and paper money of the
United States or any other country that is designated as legal tender and that circulates and is
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance,” to the

142

SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
Id. at 301.
144
See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
145
See, SEC Names Valerie A. Szczepanik Senior Advisor for Digital Assets and Innovation. Szczepanik also
named Associate Director in Division of Corporation Finance, Press Release, June 4, 2018
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-102 (last visited on August 6, 2018). Szczepanik’s new role is to
“coordinate efforts across all SEC Divisions and Offices regarding the application of U.S. securities laws to
emerging digital asset technologies and innovations, including Initial Coin Offerings and cryptocurrencies.” Id.
146
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.)
is a law governing the secondary trading of securities (stocks, bonds, and debentures) in the United States of
America. See also Cyan, 138 S. Ct., at 1062.
147
See Mokhtarian, supra note 112.
148
See Baris & Klayman, supra note 15, at 70.
143
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extent that the digital currency “does not have any legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”149
Bitcoin is an example of this currency distinction: it is not considered a currency in the United
States since it lacks the recognition by any state.150
Brian Quintenz of the CFTC has spoken on the complexity of the classification of
tokens:
However, just because a product is tokenized does not change its underlying
qualities. For example, if Disney World were to tokenize the admissions to
its theme parks, those tokens would still be tickets. Tokenizing the tickets
does not make them currencies and it does not make them securities. It makes
them tickets. Similarly, tokenizing a security does not change the fact that it
is a security.151
Quintenz further explained why he thought there might be a frenzy around digital
tokens:
As I postulated two days ago at the City Week conference in London, I see
three main motivations for the broader tokenization revolution. One
motivation for a company or entity to tokenize a product is purely as a
marketing ploy—to take advantage of the popular and speculative mania
surrounding all things “token.” . . . A second motivation to create a token is
to enable and realize the efficiency of the blockchain construct in assigning
and tracking ownership. This is having, and will continue to have, an impact
on title transfer and settlement processes. Think of this as the back office
tokenization revolution. Lastly, a third motivation is to utilize the
transferability of tokens to create a secondary market for any and all nontangible things—the eBay of Intangibles so to speak—for rights, services,
permissions, etc., that the seller allows to be transferred between parties.152

149

U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering,
Exchanging,
or
Using
Virtual
Currencies,
1
(March
18,
2018),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
150
Gregory M. Karch, Bitcoin, the Law and Emerging Public Policy: Towards a 21st Century Regulatory
Scheme, 10 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 193, 231 (2014); see also Lorena Yashira Gely-Rojas, Cryptocurrencies and
the Uniform Commercial Code: The Curious Case of Bitcoin, 8 U. OF P. R. BUS. L. J.129, 132–34 (2017).
151
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (CFTC), Remarks of Commissioner Brian Quintenz before
the
Eurofi
High
Level
Seminar
2018,
(Apr.
26,
2018)
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opaquintenz11 (last visited Oct. 7, 2018);
152
Id. Commissioner Quintenz also complimented the secondary market development: “Empowering a
secondary market’s price discovery and valuation functions for products that were previously untransferable—
such as extra storage space on a home computer—is a fascinating development.” Id.
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Because violations of Section 5 may result in rescission, cautious companies proceed
gingerly by filing under the Reg. CF exemption.153

Commissioner Quintenz noted the

transformative nature of coins in ICO transactions, stating that “[t]hey may start their life as a
security from a capital-raising perspective but then at some point . . . turn into a commodity.”154
In the next section, we discuss the rationale and methodology for this research study and what
can be learned from investment crowdfunding data.
The growth of digital tokens in Reg. CF offerings raises three troubling concerns. First,
Reg. CF digital tokens are showing a greater momentum than other Reg. CF offerings. As a
digital token could have different characteristics, an investor would need to review the
particular description very closely. Consider Rohr and Wright’s argument that tokens lack
“homogeneity.’’155 Query, what then are investors purchasing? Moreover, as digital tokens are
being sold to investors to finance unbuilt technological funding portals and services for future
initial coin offering transactions, Reg. CF investors are taking the greatest risks of loss. These
unsophisticated and non-accredited investors are subject to a set of different investor
qualifications and resale restrictions than ICO transactions, which are being closely monitored
by the SEC. Not so much the case with digital token offerings under Reg. CF.
Second, the company disclosures contain the standard legend and the risks of investing
in these type of transactions:
A crowdfunding investment involves risk. An investor should not invest any
funds in this [o]ffering unless he or she can afford to lose his or her entire
investment. In making an investment decision, investors must rely on their
own examination of the [i]ssuer and the terms of the [o]ffering, including the

153

Indeco, Regulation Crowdfunding Offering Memorandum Part II, (June 27, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1722197/000172219718000005/indeco1.pdf. Indeco CEO explains
why his company had enough concerns to proceed and file with the Securities Exchange Commission. He took the
position that the token offering could be considered something other than a “utility” and more likely a “security.”
Id. See also Indeco Launces First Token Pre-Sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules, MEDIUM (Dec.
5, 2017), https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfundingrules-e82dad79345
154
Lukas Schor, Explaining The “Simple Agreement for Future Tokens” Framework, MEDIUM (Nov. 29,
2017)
https://medium.com/@argongroup/explaining-the-simple-agreement-for-future-tokens-framework15d5e7543323 (describing Commissioner Quintenz’ statement as “probably the most specific comment by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission regarding the classification of ICO’s and shows quite well the bipolar
nature of many tokens”).
155
See Rohr, supra note 19, at 2.
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merits and risks involved. . . . These securities have not been recommended
or approved by any federal or state securities commission or regulatory
authority. Furthermore, these authorities have not passed upon the accuracy
or adequacy of this document. The SEC does not pass upon the merits of
any [s]ecurities offered or the terms of the [o]ffering, nor does it pass upon
the accuracy or completeness of any offering document or literature. These
Securities are offered under an exemption from registration; however, the
SEC has not made an independent determination that these securities are
exempt from registration.156
Other Reg. CF offerings, go further outlining some of the risks of investing in blockchain based
tokens:
The chain code concept, the underlying software application and software
platform . . . is still in an early development stage and unproven. There is
no warranty or assurance that the process for creating [] Tokens will be
uninterrupted or error-free and there is an inherent risk that the software
could contain defects, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, bugs or viruses causing
the complete loss of [] contributions and/or [] Tokens. Additionally, there
are other risks associated with the acquisition, storage, transfer and use of []
Tokens, including those that . . . may not be [anticipated]. Such risks may
further materialize as unanticipated variations or combinations of the
risks.157
The research begs the question why anyone after reading these disclaimers would invest
in digital token offerings? If the blockchain token concept does not materialize, it is likely that
the companies seeking to use them will not have adequate funding to repay the obligation and
the investors may lose all or a portion of their investment.
Third, the SEC needs to rethink how to advise unsophisticated investors, who may not
have an income to fall back on if the investment fails as do accredited investors.158 It is
uncertain whether the underlying premise for the offerings will create a framework for “digital

156

See Pokeology, Crowdfunding Offering Statement, NEXTSEED, at 14 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1720051/000172005117000001/document1.pdf
157
Blockchain
for
Delayed
Flights,
TRUSTABIT,
at
24,
https://trustabit.io/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/TrustaBit-final.pdf.
158
Another common disclaimer in offering memorandum of Reg. CF offerings is “[a] crowdfunding
investment involves risk. An investor should not invest any funds in this Offering unless he or she can afford to
lose his or her entire investment.” See Pokeology, supra note 156, at 14.
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assets used in connection with decentralized services, applications, and communities.”159 As
promising as these offerings may be, digital token are fundamentally based on a theoretical
idea.
While federal agencies and the courts sort out their respective roles in regulating
cryptocurrencies,160 there is a quiet digital token revolution occurring within smaller Reg. CF
campaigns.
B. Digital Token Research and Summary of Findings
1. Rationale and Methodology for Research Study

There is an ongoing need for federal and state agencies, companies, and investors, to
analyze available data to assess the current state of capital formation and employment under
this new regulation. A better understanding of the offerings and transactions that have
transpired over the past several years would provide a template for future successful offerings,
better investor protection, and better crafted regulatory policies aimed at accomplishing the
normative goals of the regulations. In this Part, we explain the methodology behind the
research project.
This research study sought to determine if the impacts of Reg. CF regulations have been
worthy of lament or applause. To determine those effects, we turn to researching available data.
After undertaking a review of the prior SEC Edgar Data, this Article provides information,
findings and analysis relating to Reg. CF campaigns in the United States.161 Researchers
retrieved and reviewed 1,112 SEC Form C notice filings and other SEC filings completed by
companies from Reg. CF’s adoption date through June 30, 2018.

159

Juan Batiz-Benet et al., The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework, PROTOCOL
LABS, at 1 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf.
160
There are a variety of proposals regarding how each agency could consider regulating, however that is not
the subject this article. The author does take the position that it is time for Congress to recognize that digital
currencies are blooming in the United States and globally. Congressional clarity on the digital currencies would
be useful.
161
See Form C et al., supra note 14.
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From May 2016 through June 30, 2018, companies filed 1,112 Form C notice filings in
Reg. CF transactions,162 offering over six-hundred million dollars of securities to investors.
These Form C filings provide critical data about the companies that seek to offer equity, debt
and investment contracts, the funding portals that provide the portal structure, and the
transactions that are offered to the crowd of potential investors.
A proactive monitoring of data can illustrate the growth, success and failures of
companies, valuable information to help policy makers continue to accurately set state and
federal policy designed to enhance innovation nationwide as well as protect investors.163 This
research provides insights on what has transpired since the adoption of Reg. CF. Further, the
Article analyzes the crowdfunding marketplace and highlights emerging developments and
trends; along with insights on Reg. CF’s impact on innovation.
The data included digitally filed responses to the following questions:
Q1. Company Demographics: Describe the names, incorporation location and principal
office of companies registering investment offerings under the Crowdfunding Act.164
Q2. Offering Details: Type of security; Target offering; Minimum offering and maximum
offering; data to quantify the amount of securities offered per period and over time.
Q3. Funding Portal Details: Description of the name of the funding portal or self-funder
for each offering and the compensation terms.
Q4. Employee Details: The number of employees the company disclosed on Form C.
Q5. Aggregate Amount of capital sought by companies disclosed on Form C.
There are limits to the data collection from the SEC Edgar database, in several respects.
First, data on Edgar would not include unregistered investment crowdfunding campaigns.
Unregistered campaigns could stem from other allowed securities transactions exempt under

162

Of the 1,112 Form C filings, several were excluded because of duplication, a subsequent withdrawal of
the filing or a request filed as a Form C, but merely an extension of the timeframes.
163
E.g. Parsont, supra note 22, at 341 (recommending that the SEC generate empirical data and conduct a
special study on capital-raising impediments and investor protection).
164
Additionally, for each company, the Central Index Key (“CIK”) was also noted. The CIK is a unique,
public number that is assigned to each entity that submits filings to the SEC. Use of the CIK allows the SEC to
differentiate between filing entities with similar names.
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other sections of the Securities laws, such as ICO’s, IPO’s or other Reg. D and 33Act filings.
Alternatively, the securities may not register because the transaction is exempt under a statelevel intrastate crowdfunding exemption. There could conceivably be campaigns that
companies are choosing not to register anywhere for various ill-advised reasons. Also, several
foreign registrants with principal offices located in the United States are not be included in the
choice of entity location data.
The research in this Article differed from earlier work in that it was not seeking to assess
the success or failure of any particular offerings, or the totality of the success of the offerings,
or to make a prediction about whether scholars could call this investment crowdfunding era a
success. Rather, the intention was to frame what we can infer about the scope of investment
crowdfunding and to provide insights and learnings about the information retrieved.165 To that
end, evaluation of the data provides insights on: investment crowdfunding’s momentum; the
companies

that

had

sought

capital

from

investors;

the

intermediation

of

the

securities/transactions; geographical scope, choice of entity and notable inferences about the
type of securities that were offered to investors. As mentioned before, since digital tokens were
noted, more detail was provided on these securities.
2. Definition of Success
Accomplishing the normative goals of job creation, access to capital, inclusion, and
efficiency would generally be thought of as success under Reg. CF. More research, over time,
is needed to determine whether the regulations have succeeded in goal attainment. For purposes
of this research project, the author defines success by three measures – company engagement,
the amount of capital actually raised, and the investors successfully obtaining a positive return
on their investment. The level of company engagement in offering capital under Reg. CF is
important because if companies are not utilizing this safe harbor exemption then it is obsolete
and serves no purpose. If they are turning to this form of investment crowdfunding, then at least
they are engaging. Another successful outcome would be for these companies to raise capital
and put that capital to use to create jobs and undertake their operations. If shareholders are not
receptive to company offerings, then again the regulations are of no utility. Also, as important
165

Within scope, one might assess risks and rewards. However, the results of many of the campaigns are
still ongoing. Thus, assessing the risks and rewards could be the subject of a future article.
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is that investors are successful and that is defined as likelihood of a positive return on
investment.
In addition to the number of companies participating and the level of the transactions,
the number of funding portals would provide insights about the developing story of investment
crowdfunding. If many companies wanted to seek capital through Reg. CF, but there were no
funding portals to help them accomplish the objective, we would be discussing the dreams and
hopes of what Reg. CF could be. However, funding portals is its own story, as further discussed
below.
3. Summary of the Findings
a. Momentum in Investment Crowdfunding
There is an overlap in the recent discussions about emerging FinTech and its effect on
legal theory and society.

FinTech-enabled transactions include tools of contracting and

commerce.166 Consequently, it is hard to imagine that investment crowdfunding on internet
funding portals would not to be considered within that definition or an expansion of that
definition. There is much to be learned about the funding portals that are provided for the
companies to raise money and their role in educating investors about transactions.
By analyzing SEC Edgar data concerning the funding portals that provide the internet
funding portals for the securities, new revelations and inferences are possible. The Form C
filings reveal which funding portal is hosting the offering and their respective costs of doing
the transactions. Also, the data illustrates the level of a “funding portal’s choice” in the type of
transactions a funding portal may choose to support. Professor Schwartz’s distinctions drawn
between the United States and New Zealand undergird the tension between efficiency versus
inclusion.167 The data hint at levels of influence that may minimize inclusion in investment
crowdfunding while enhancing efficiencies for the funding portal. Further, the analysis also
provides data about the funding portal’s choice of company transactions around the country.

166

Christopher G. Bradley, Fintech’s Double Edges, 93 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV., 61, 77 (2018) (arguing that
FinTech has a broad definition and is divided into three types, especially in the consumer area: efficient
information gathering and monitoring; tools of contracting and commerce; and enforcement and dispute resolution
tools).
167
See generally Schwartz, supra note 11, at 885–86.

| P a g e 34

Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019) [10-Dec-2018 11:50am

Data is provided on the funding portals and their intermediation. One trend noted is a
trend towards efficiency, as fewer funding portals handle a greater portion of the transactions.
At the same time, as investment crowdfunding campaigns are growing, there is also are more
funding portals responsible doing a few transactions. The investment crowdfunding geographic
concentrations and dispersal are noted by Professor Magnuson as a form of “diffusion” in the
Fintech Markets.168

Magnuson argues that FinTech has “defied [the] conventional

understanding” of concentration of financial markets.169 In Fintech markets, the players have
“smaller sections of the market, focus on narrow industry areas, and often are made up of a
number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”170 From the data collected, between
2017 and 2018, funding portals have increasing concentrations of deals, while at the same time,
there are more funding portals, that are hosting a greater number of the campaigns. A future
research project could evaluate the role and impact of this level of funding portal concentration
and dispersion on business capital formation. The role of funding portals and how they advance
inclusion.
Reg. CF digital token offerings sold to investors are growing at a greater pace than
traditional investment crowdfunding securities offerings. If the growth continues at this pace,
these Reg. CF digital tokens will expand the type and quality of securities historically offered
to investors. The Reg. CF digital tokens are also disrupting the investment marketplace, as
these initial transactions are a leverage to other, future initial coin offerings (“ICOs” or “initial
coin offerings”).

This development may provide both potentially positive and negative

disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on the success of blockchain
technology.
Despite the market’s infancy, findings suggest that investment crowdfunding some has
enjoyed sustained momentum. There is greater breadth in the number of companies performing
these publicly offered crowdfunding campaigns. Campaigns can be measured by increasing
numbers of company principal office locations throughout the country, increasing amounts and
type of securities offerings, and increasing variety in the companies that are participating. Since

168

William J. Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 23 STAN. J. L., BUS., AND FIN., (forthcoming
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstracts=3148036.
169
Id.
170
Id.
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Reg. CF’s inception, over 1,100 companies have offered over six hundred million dollars of
securities to investors under Reg. CF.

These amounts represent a sizable expansion in

investment crowdfunding under these regulations which rebuts the notion that few would use
the exemption.
b. Securities and Digital Token Risk
Investors have had the opportunity to invest in a variety of companies’ securities
offerings. Investors in Reg. CF offerings need not be accredited, wealthy, or financially
sophisticated,171 to participate in these transactions. Investors can invest amounts ranging from
$2,000 to $107,000 in a 12-month period depending on their income and net worth.172
Securities offerings have ranged from traditional common and preferred stock offerings, to less
traditional options like convertible debt, membership and partnership units, investment
contracts, and digital tokens. The SEC considers investment crowdfunding investments as
exempt from registration, and the securities have resale restrictions that raise liquidity issues.173
The type of securities that investors may buy from company crowdfunding campaigns
and the risks that may flow from these agreements are important lines of legal research. Legal
inquiry into business transactions is different from business inquiry regarding the transactions.
In a business inquiry, one would want to know whether the company has good fundamentals,174
whether it is a good business risk, and whether the market conditions are right for this particular
type of venture so that the investor can receive a return on his or her investment. Evaluating
the text of securities and investment contracts in order to determine legality and risk is the realm
of securities lawyers and tax professionals.

171

North American Securities Administrators Administration, Informed Advisory: Crowdfunding, Who Can
Invest?, (July 24, 2018) http://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-crowdfunding/ (last visited Oct.
27, 2018).
172
Id. Hypothetically, an investor could invest $0.25 or larger dollar amounts offered by issuers. Most deals
have larger entry points for investment. For example, although a share may cost .25 cents per share, a minimum
contribution might be 100 shares, resulting in a $25 investment.
173
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2015). See also Regulation Crowdfunding Release Nos. 33-9974, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2018).
174
Business fundamentals might include: due diligence regarding the proof of concept, a viable business
plan, the leadership and human resources, the finances and profitability, the product/service, promotion and the
place.
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There is a level of uncertainty and risk with a company offering digital tokens based on
the blockchain for both the company and the investor. The classification of these type of
securities is unsettled with questions as to whether the digital tokens are securities, commodities
or utilities. This leads to concerns about actual investment outcomes for the investors who range
from the sophisticated to the unsophisticated, and from the accredited to the non-accredited. In
Form C filings, companies are required to identify risks that are specific to the business and its
financial condition.175 Generally, companies disclose language relating to risks of an economic
downturn, political events, and technological developments (such as hacking and the ability or
inability to prevent hacking).176 Enhanced risks for early-stage companies that are greater than
the typical risk of a startup, is another cause of concern.177
There are a variety of other types of information that are retrievable from the data,
including geographical data, choice of entity, and principal office locations. Only a brief
summary of the data concerning geographic location of all investment crowdfunding
transactions is included in this Article. The scope of the geographical investment crowdfunding
data may have broader implications regarding the reasons why capital blackouts in areas around
the country are occurring. Also, jurisdiction and principal office location is a robust topic,
which also can be covered in a broader research paper.
c. Company Choice of Entity and Principal Offices

This research study did not retrieve incorporation or organizational documents.
However, what is apparent from the Form C notice filings is that a larger concentration of
companies select Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in 2016.178 Choice of entity

175

Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/files/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 28,

2018).

176
See, e.g., Mobile Spike Form C, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674319/000167431916000003/mobilespikeformc.pdf (last visited
Oct. 28, 2018).
177
See Patrick McCarney, Note, False Start: Carving a Niche for Established Small Business
Participation in Regulation Crowdfunding Rules Designed for Startups, 51 IND. L. REV. 277, 296 (2018).
178
See infra Part II(C). More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to Delaware.
It could be a function of larger deals, herd behavior, or other legal, business and tax considerations. See also
Magnuson, supra note 168, at 22 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in Fintech markets). “This may occur in
several different ways, but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs sharing certain programming

37

|Page

Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019) [10-Dec-2018 11:50am

provides context to the law applying to “the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible
charter and bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights,” which are “considerations controlled
by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation has any real
economic ties to that location.”179 Empirical work on choice of entity also can “illuminate how
parties actually behave” and how the “parties would be likely to behave in response to legal
rules.”180 Professor Cherry notes that corporations engage in races to the bottom, not only in
selecting the jurisdiction of incorporation that will govern their internal corporate affairs, but
in labor and regulatory considerations as well.181
In the context of digital coin disputes, choice of entity will likely be an important
jurisdictional question. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cyan v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund,182 permitted some claims under the 1933 Act to be brought in
state courts (as well as federal courts). The private bar has predicted that there will be a surge
in state court filings asserting that initial coin offerings contain materially false information.183
A second federal judge in the Northern District of California, cited Cyan, recently .184 These
decisions provide state courts with authority to proceed on a variety of claims brought by civil
litigators, including claims under Section 10(b)5.185 Companies offering securities under Reg.
CF are not exempt from these securities law provisions, even though the transactions are
smaller in size. Consequently, there is a growing preference toward a Delaware incorporation.
Last, the Reg. CF offerings are mostly concentrated as common stock, simple agreements for
equity, convertible debt offerings, with an emerging trend in digital tokens.

templates. If an algorithm proves successful in the market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate
the algorithm.” Id.
179
Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and
Bylaws, 104 GEO. L. J., 583, 597 (2016).
180
Kyle Chen, et al., Empirical Study Redux on Choice of Law and Forum in M&A: The Data and its Limits,
16 J. BUS. & SEC. L., Fall 2015, at 1, 31–32.
181
Miriam Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GEORGIA L. REV., 951, 960–61 (2011).
182
Cyan, Inc. et al. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018).
183
Douglas Flaum, et al. ICO Battlefields Proliferate: Preparing for Private Litigation and Regulation Now,
THE RECORDER, (Apr. 27, 2018) https://www.law.com/therecorder/2018/04/27/ico-battlefields-proliferatepreparing-for-private-litigation-and-regulation-now/?slreturn=20180813122201 (noting the role of the private bar
to “flesh out the application of long-standing legal concepts to the novel issues raised”); See, e.g., Wildes v.
Bitconnect International PLC, No. 18-cv-80086 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2018).
184
Baker v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, No. 17-cv-06850 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018).
185
Flaum, supra note 183, at 4 (“[T]he Cyan ruling not only gives plaintiffs a choice of forums in Securities
Act claims, but potentially allows for multiple concurrent actions regarding the same ICO—an outcome that not
only leads to the potential of inconsistent rulings, but certainly will increase the cost of defending this type of
litigation.”).
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d. Investment Crowdfunding Generally
Studying the Reg. CF parties, funding portals and offerings provides a better
understanding of whether the normative goals set forth by the Crowdfund Act have been
attained. When we consider what the data means, the conversation quickly becomes normative.
Is Reg. CF the best way for companies to form capital? Is there a better way to create jobs than
this current investment crowdfunding framework? To the extent the data defies our thinking
about what is happening in investment crowdfunding markets, without more research, we will
not be able to know for sure whether the positive story is as good as it gets, because these small
companies could not raise any more money than they did under Reg. CF. Alternatively, is the
negative story merely the flip side of a positive story because companies not using Reg. CF
found other alternatives financing opportunities to their capital needs?
There appears to be a limited benefit in Reg. CF offerings, which is illustrated in the
next section. What we know is that investors have historically been able to invest in large
enterprises and those investments have produced both social and economic benefits (and losses)
for the companies and the shareholders. That data is highlighted daily with disclosures to the
SEC, and articles in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Forbes and Barron. Further,
what we also know is that accredited and sophisticated investors have been able to invest in
companies that file under a variety of safe harbor exemptions and under the 1933 Act and that
startups still have trouble raising capital. Companies that have these investors available to them
could tap into other safe harbor exemptions and file under Reg. A or Reg. D.
Consequently, it appears that the major benefit of Reg. CF investment crowdfunding is
to provide a place where companies can tap into the general public of unsophisticated or
unaccredited investors. If these companies had access to sophisticated or accredited investors,
they likely would file under another safe harbor exemptions. The fact that the general public
is solicited is one reason that regulators should evaluate what is actually being offered to
investors. In the next section, the author provides additional details about the data that provides
information on the growth in investment crowdfunding and more specifically, digital tokens.
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C. Shedding Light on Data
1. Quantum Thought?
There is quantitative data and then there is the meaning that we assert about the data.
After reviewing the data, the idea of Nick Szabo resonates,
“…quantum thought, as I call it -- although it already has
a traditional name less recognizable to the modern ear,
scholastic thought -- demands that we simultaneously consider
often mutually contradictory possibilities.”186
The next portion of this article, sets forth the data of the study. The terms that apply to them
might vary depending on the party interpreting the data. Is the idea that over $600 million
dollars was offered under Reg. CF a cause to celebrate or does it show that Reg. CF offerings
pale in comparison to the broader ICO, IPO markets? When we look at the growth
progression of digital tokens, we could hypothesize that there is a 500% growth in digital
token offerings, year over year. Yet, the total aggregate numbers of digital token offerings
remain small in comparison to investment crowdfunding generally or the larger ICO coin
offerings. The same reasoning could be applied to the data that relates to the progress of
funding portals throughout the country. Arguable, more funding portals are developing across
the nation. However, there are pockets where there no funding portals and some funding
portals primarily offer digital tokens, which may or may not be the best investment for
unsophisticated investors. Thus, normative claims about what is happening is reserved more
study and a better understanding that will come with time.
Below are a series of Charts that capture the data from the research study:
186

Nick
Szabo,
“More
Short
Takes,”
Unenumerated,
July
1,
2012,
http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2012/07/more-short-takes.html. Tom Robert Shaw, Practicing Quantum
Thought (August 14, 2017), states that to practice quantum thought, one is reminded that “no matter how confident
we are, we should be the first to question our own point of view” and affirming statements of Nick Szabo, “we can
be both for and against a proposition because we can be considering at least two significantly possible but
inconsistent hypotheses, or because we favour some parts of ideas but not others”
https://tomrobertshaw.net/2017/08/practicing-quantum-thought/ (last visited on December 9, 2018).
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FINDING A1: ESTIMATED $600 MILLION INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING
OFFERINGS 2016-2018 (SEE CHART 1).
Chart 1 – Investment Crowdfunding All Reg. CF Offerings 2016 – 2018
Investment Crowdfunding Offerings
By Six-month Periods 2016 - 2018
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$200,000,000.00

$150,000,000.00

$100,000,000.00

$50,000,000.00

$May 2016 Dec. 2016

Jan. 2017 –
June 2017

July 2017 –
Dec. 2017

Jan . 20 18 June 2018

May-Dec.2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June2017 - $131.6 Million;
July-Dec2017 - $173.36 Million; Jan-June2018 - $215.5 Million Dollars

FINDING A2: GROWTH PROGRESSION NOTED IN 2017 (SEE CHART 2).
Chart 2 – Investment Crowdfunding Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth Progression
Investment crowdfunding Growth in Offering Progression 2016 - 2018
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$200,000,000.00
$150,000,000.00
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$May 2016 - Dec. 2016 Jan. 2017 – June 2017 July 2017 – Dec. 2017 Jan. 2018 - June 2018

Chart: May-Dec.2016 - $126.98 Million; Jan-June2017 - $131.6 Million; July-Dec2017 - $173.36 Million;
Jan-June2018 - $215.5 Million Dollars
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FINDING A3: BY 2018, DELAWARE AS CHOICE OF ENTITY PREFERRED
(SEE CHART 3).
Chart 3 – 2018 Company Choice of Entity compared to 2016 Choice of Entity
2018: Top 7 Choice of Entity Locations for
Investment crowdfunding

2016: Top 7 Choice of Entity
Locations for
Investment crowdfunding
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Chart: *Pennsylvania and Virginia were tied for 7th place

FINDING A4: DELAWARE PREFERRED AS THE CHOICE OF ENTITY FOR
DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS (SEE CHART 4).
Chart 4 – 2018 Company Choice of Entity for Digital Token offerings
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2. From SAFE to Blockchain Based Digital Tokens
In this section, we explore how digital tokens have been characterized in the Reg. CF
offerings between 2016 and 2018 and the scope of the offerings.
Companies included over $22 million-worth of Reg. CF securities offerings with tokens
in investment crowdfunding offerings beginning in November of 2017 through June 2018.
These new digital token investment contracts have increased by five hundred percent starting
in 2017 to 2018. Considering there were no Reg. CF digital tokens in 2016, they have increased
two thousand percent since 2016.
It is important to note that the vast number of digital tokens offered throughout the United
States are not offered under Reg. CF. There is a larger spectrum of all Reg. CF campaigns, in
comparison to initial coin offering campaigns. Reg. CF digital token transactions remain a
small, albeit important, slice of capital raising. To better understand this point, it is best to view
the spectrum graphically. Between 2016 and 2018, companies sought to raise over $615 million
dollars under Reg. CF–of that amount, $22.2 million related to digital tokens. Estimates
graphically illustrate that digital tokens currently are less than 3% of total Reg. CF offerings.
a.

Growth of Digital Tokens in Reg. CF

FINDING B1: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL IN COMPARISON TO ALL
REG. CF INVESTMENT CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS (SEE CHART 5).
Chart 5 - All Reg. CF offerings, $615 Million; digital token offerings, $22.2 Million; and
All Other Reg. CF Campaigns (Equity and Debt), $598 Million.

2016-2018 Reg. CF digital tokens Compared to
All Other Reg. CF Offerings (in millions)
All Reg. CF Offerings (Non Tokens)
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Also, to understand the context of Reg. CF digital token offerings in comparison to
initial coin offerings, the next graph illustrates that the aggregate dollar amount of Reg. CF
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digital token offerings is exceedingly small compared to the aggregate dollar amount of ICO
offerings. In fact, Reg. CF digital tokens, representing over $22 million in offerings, are less
than .2% of total coin offerings.
FINDING B2: REG. CF TOKENS OFFERINGS SMALL IN COMPARISON TO ICO
OFFERINGS OF $11.3 BILLION (SEE CHART 6).
Chart 6 - Composite of estimated coin offerings, including ICO’s ($11.3 Billion), All Reg. CF
offerings ($620 million) of which digital token offerings ($22.2) – Comparison

2016-2018 ICO's Compared to All Reg. CF digital
tokens in Millions
Initial Coin Offerings
All Reg. CF Offerings
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Considering this context, digital token offerings under Reg. CF could be considered small in
comparison to the movement currently happening with ICOs. These small digital tokens are
providing early stage companies capital to launch later stage transactions.
During the first six months of 2018, over $16.9 million of securities were offered with
digital assets tied to blockchain, otherwise described as Reg. CF digital tokens. For the sixmonth period in 2018, there is a developing second phase of investment contracts. In the first
phase, investment crowdfunding transactions included SAFEs and revenue-sharing
instruments,187 giving investors the right to future shares in a company. However, the company
may never receive a future equity financing or elect to convert the securities upon such future
financing. In addition, the company may never undergo a liquidity event such as a sale of the
company or an IPO. If neither the conversion of the securities nor a liquidity event occurs, the
Purchasers could be left holding the securities in perpetuity. The securities have numerous
transfer restrictions and will likely be highly illiquid, with no secondary market in which to sell

187

See Wroldsen, supra, note 7, at 555, 569–70, 573–76 (discussing the offering of revenue-sharing and
SAFE instruments under Reg. CF). See also Heminway, supra note 10, at 7.
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them. The securities are not equity interests, have no ownership rights, have no rights to the
company’s assets or profits, and have no voting rights or ability to direct the company or its
actions. If someone invests, he or she is betting that the company will be worth more than $7
million in the future.
It should be noted that many offerings are still in progress. However, the data about
demographics, geographical regional level of participation nationwide, the principal office
locations are digital token offerings are established at the filing date. In Chart 7, the author
provides data as to the date and maximum amount of the offering; the capital raised as of
November 30, 2018, the name of the company and the digital token offered; and the company
principal office location and the choice of entity location.
FINDING B3: DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS GROWING MORE RAPIDLY IN
2018. (SEE CHART 7).
Chart 7 - 2018 Reg. CF digital tokens offerings188

Amount of
2018
Offerings

Capital
Raised by
November
30, 2018

Form Filings (C/A
and C-W)

$ 898,000

$171,287.00

Form C/A –
Extended until
2018.Oct2

$1,070,000

-

$1,069,999

$94,166.40

$1,070,000

$10,388.00

Form C/A- Extended
until 5/30/ 2019
Reg. A Filed for $20
Million 2018.Aug8
Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Sept5
Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Dec31

Name of Company and
Digital Token

Date of
Token
Offering

Entity Choice/
Principal
Office
Location

Indeco Financial Syndicate
Inc’s
Debt Until Securities Token
Offering (DUSTO)
Item Banc Inc.’s
IBE Tokens (IBE)

2018.
June28

DE/Virginia

2018.
June18

SC/South
Carolina

Dashing Corp., Inc’s
Dashing Tokens
Test Foundation, Inc.’s
Token Debt Payable by Assets

2018.
June6
2018.
May31

DE/Oregon
DE/California

188
This listing of information does not include debt offerings of companies that are not offering tokens in
the original offer. E.g. Blockstack Token, LLC offering $1.07 Million on March 1, 2018 to raise capital with a
debt offering; a target of $200K at $1 price. Also, E.g. Unicoin Blockchain Inc., which is offering class B nonvoting common stock at $10 per share, with a minimum target offering of $10,000 and a maximum offering of
$80,000. Additional information regarding the actual capital raised was retrieved from the Startengine website
for Indeco, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Oct. 6, 2018) and Witnet. See Republic Crypto,
https://republic.co/witnet (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
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$1,070,000

0*

Withdrawn*
Form C-W Filed

Access Network Labs, Inc.
Token Debt Payable by Assets

2018.
May 30

DE/New York

$1,070,000

$16,581.00

Form C/A -Extended
until 10/29/2018

TrustaBit, LLC’s
TAB Tokens

2018.
May 29

DE/California

$107,000

$22,290.00*

Withdrawn*
Form C-W Filed

Time Token, Inc.’s Preferred
Equity Time (PET) Tokens

2018.
May 23

DE/Arizona

$1,070,000

$118,200.00

Form C/A- Extended
until 10/29/2018

2018.
May 15

DE/California

$1,070,000

-

Form C/A- Extended

$29,800.00

Form C/AExtended until
2019.Feb4

2018.
May 11
2018.
May4

DE/California

$1,070,000

CEN, Inc.’s
Basic Intelligence (BIT)
Tokens
EventJoin, Inc.’s
SAB Tokens
JWL Com, Inc.
JWL Coins

$1,070,000

$122,487.00

Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Aug21

Citizen Health Project, Inc.’s
MEDEX or MDX Tokens

2018.
April24

DE/Mississippi

$1,070,000

10,866.00

n/a

One Sphera Inc.
CC Tokens

2018.
April20

NV/Nevada

$1,070,000

$157,234

Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Dec31

GeoPulse Exploration, Inc.’s
CannCoin Tokens

2018.
April20

NV/Nevada

$107,000

-

n/a

$11,342.52*

Withdrawn*
Form C-W Filed

2018.
April20
2018.
April20

DE/Utah

$106,998

Fullmeta Corp.’s
META Tokens
FrToken, Inc.’s
CHIKN Tokens

DE/California

DE/New
Mexico

$1,070,000

$80,141.00

Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Nov3

Erndo, Inc.’s
Violet Tokens

2018.
April20

DE/Delaware

$1,000,000

$15,550.00

Supporter Inc.’s
SP Tokens

2018.
April19

GA/Georgia

$1,070,000

$152,741.00
$27,040.68

MintHealth, Inc.’s
Mintheath Tokens
Crowdcoverage, Inc.
COVR Tokens

2018.
April19
2018.
April19

DE/California

$107,000
$1,070,000

$36,700.80

Form C/AExtended until
2018.Sept18
Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.Sept10
Form C/AExtended until
2018.Sept14
Form C/A- Extended
until 2018.July31
Form D filed under
506(c) for a $20
Million Offering

EpigenCare, Inc.’s
EPIC Tokens

2018.
March20

NY/New York

$1,070,000

$1,069,983

Witnet Foundation, Inc.’s
WIT Tokens

2018.
March1

DE/New Jersey

$17,375,997

$2,113,166

TOTAL

2018

Form D filed for a
$13.9 Million
Offering

DE/Nevada
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In 2018, 100% of the companies were tech related startup companies that sought to raise
capital by offering digital tokens. The type of technology startups varied by the target clients,
goods or service markets. For example, most of the companies identified as funding portals or
technology businesses seeking to develop blockchain networks; six companies broadly
identified as tech companies with health, consumer health registry or biotech applications; one
company was developing a platform for cannabis sales; two developed web based marketing
services; one a jewelry product, tech insurance services; and another a tech security company.
By contrast, during 2017, companies offered digital tokens in only four offerings. The
types of companies varied, from medical records to sports—football, renewable energy and solar
energy startups. All four 2017 offerings included investment contracts and, in each case, a
SAFT. Additionally, each of the four digital token offerings is tied to the development of a
blockchain distributed ledger.
FINDING B4: DIGITAL TOKENS REPRESENTED FOUR OFFERINGS IN 2017
(SEE CHART 8).
Chart 8: Reg. CF digital tokens in the 2017 offerings
Amount of
2017
Offerings

Amount of
Capital
Raised 2017

Name of Digital Tokens

Date of
Token
Offering

Name, Entity
Location/
Princ. Office

$1,070,000

$466,896

Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT)

2017.
Dec29

MedChain,
Inc.

2017.
Dec11

Fanchise
League
Company,
LLC

Mission: To use blockchain technology to
establish a better, more secure and transparent
framework for Electronic Medical Record that
vastly improves the quality of care for patients
and helps reduce healthcare providers’ costs.
$1,070,000

$1,068,600

Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT)
Fanchise Tokens
Mission: Built on the Blockchain and designed to
combine the passion of live sport, the
competition of fantasy sports, the engagement of
video games, and the global reach of esports, the
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FCFL is the first pro sports league truly created
for the digital age.
$1,070,000

$106,450

Simple Agreement for a Future Token (SAFT)

2017.
Nov17

Sun Fund
Renewables,
Inc.

2017.
Nov9

Indeco, LLC

Mission:…a real-world company building
revenue generating renewable energy assets that
is also developing an Ethereum-based
blockchain currency platform. With the ability
to implement smart contracts on a distributed
ledger, the Sun Fund token will bring liquidity
and a store of value for renewable energy assets
while also helping to disintermediate global
financial and energy markets.
$744,000

$172,287

Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)
Indecoin Tokens

Filed a
Form C/A
to extend
the
deadline to
2018.Jan18

$3,954,000

Mission: To be a stable crypto asset for stored
value, an investment vehicle and an engine
for the expansion of the clean economy,
including solar energy, battery storage and smart
controls and sensors for energy efficiency. Our
network will support four independent roles with
distinct, interoperable smart contracts.

$1,813,233

Totals

b. Growth Compared to Other Capital Formation
FINDING B5: COMPARISON OF DIGITAL TOKENS FROM 2017 TO 2018 (SEE
CHART 9).
Chart 9: Reg. CF Digital Tokens under Reg. CF 2017 - 2018

Reg. CF Digital Tokens 2017 and 2018
$20,000,000.00
$15,000,000.00
$10,000,000.00
$5,000,000.00
$1

2
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The locations of the principal offices of companies offering securities under Reg. CF.
The principal locations are western states, such as California, Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah and Oregon.

The next grouping is locations in Delaware, New York,

Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, South Carolina and Mississippi. This research project does not
address the reasons why there is not participation in digital tokens by companies in states
outside of coastal areas.
FINDING B6: PRINCIPAL OFFICE LOCATIONS ARE PRIMARILY LOCATED IN
CALIFORNIA; THEN DELAWARE, NEVADA AND NEW YORK (SEE CHART 10).
Chart 10 – Principal Office Location of Reg. CF Digital Token Offerings

Principal Office Location of
Reg. CF Digital Token Offerings
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FINDING B7: GROWTH PROGRESSION OF DIGITAL TOKENS IS
ACCELERATING IN LATE 2017 THROUGHOUT 2018. (SEE CHART 11).
Chart 11 – Reg. CF 2016-2018 Growth Progression of Reg. CF digital tokens

Growth Progression of Token Campaigns
25
20
15
10
5
0
2016 Reg CF Offerings

2017 Reg CF Campaigns

2018 Reg CF Campaign

Chart: 2016 – 0 campaigns; 2017 – 4 campaigns; 2018 - 20 campaign
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2. Funding Portal Intermediation Findings
FINDING C1: REGISTERED FUNDING PORTALS EXPANDED ACROSS THE
COUNTRY
One of the requirements of Reg. CF is that companies use a funding portal to host the
offering. The role of the funding portal is best described in Werbach’s description of an
intermediary:189
“What makes activity happen in this arrangement is the intermediaries’
ability to aggregate activity on both sides. Financial services relationships
are a good example of intermediary trust. Commercial banks sit in the middle
of the transaction flow between depositors and borrowers…..Investment
banks structure and intermediate financial transactions in capital markets….”
As of July 11, 2018, there were forty-three funding portals registered to serve in the role as
funding portals for the companies offering securities under Reg. CF. These entities served the
crowdfunding market by providing structure for the transactions over the past three years.
The chart below provides a listing of the top five funding portals completing a majority
of all of the investment crowdfunding transactions for this period. There are two notable
inferences from this data. First, StartEngine Capital, LLC is doing a lion share of the investment
crowdfunding offerings, which suggests that this particular funding portal has an effective
system for raising of capital. Second, the number of overall funding portals is increasing, but
fewer funding portals are conducting more offerings.
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS CONSOLIDATED OFFERINGS AND MORE
FUNDING PORTALS REGISTERED (SEE CHART 12).
Chart 12 – 2018 Jan - June Funding Portals By # of Offerings
2018 Jan. - June Funding Portals By # of Offerings
18 other Dealmakers
Open Deal LLC aka "Republic"
NetCapital LLC
SI Securities LLC
WeFunder Portal LLC
StartEngine Capital LLC
0

189

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Werbach, supra note 15, at 28.
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During the prior six-month period of January–June 2017, StartEngine Capital LLC,
WeFunder, and SI Securities LLC were the three leading funding portals for investment
crowdfunding offerings. Next, First Democracy VC and OpenDeal, LLC also performed a
number of transactions. From January—June 2017, the same five funding portals hosted
offerings.
The principal funding portals that assist companies with digital token offerings are Start
Engine Capital, LLC, Open Deal, Inc. d/b/a Republic, First Democracy VC, and truCrowd, Inc.
The chart below illustrates just how many more offerings StartEngine Capital, LLC is
conducting compared to other funding portals in the digital token space. Also, the chart
illustrates where most of the digital token offerings are hosted and the pace at which they are
growing from 2017 to 2018. The funding portal, StartEngine Capital, LLC is substantially
greater than any other funding portal, which calls into question the scope and growth of Reg.
CF digital tokens in investment crowdfunding.
FINDING C2: FUNDING PORTALS ACCELERATING BUT CONCENTRATION IN
FOUR FUNDING PORTALS IN 2018. (SEE CHART 13).
Chart 13 – 2017 - 2018 Funding Portals By # of Offerings for Reg. CF digital tokens

Funding Portal Hosting Reg. CF digital tokens
2017-2018
StartEngine Capital, LLC
OpenDeal Inc. d/b/a Republic
First Democracy VC
truCrowd, Inc.
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2. Terms and Conditions of Offerings
As might be expected in different industries, the descriptions of the SAFTs or other digital
token investments can vary significantly. For example, in the Fanchise Sports League, Inc.
digital token offering, the company provides its investors the right to vote on games and
provides an opportunity to participate in a $1,000,000 purse on football team winnings, based
on the number of digital tokens that the investor owns.190 This right to vote on games is unique
to this particular transaction as it engages the investor in the company’s games and allows them
to potentially win, when their team wins. Another company, MedChain would allow its
MedChain utility tokens to “used within the network to purchase entry credits facilitating
Electronic Medical Record storage and access control.”191
The right to actually receive a digital token or some other means of non-security utility
Tokens varies by Offering. Most of the 2018 companies discuss the right to receive a future
utility token, contingent upon the company’s creation of a network based upon blockchain and
distributed ledger technology.192 Or other language, such as, “the right to receive future utility
tokens when and if the company creates a network based upon blockchain and distributed ledger
technology.”193 In some offerings, the investors are allowed to choose whether they receive
back cash or a “possible” digital token. Some companies state that only they will decide
whether the investor receives digital tokens, common stock or other cash payment.
Voting rights vary across transactions. In most transactions, the investor does not have
voting rights in company decisions. However, there are various decisions on which an investor
could vote, such as what new promotional events the company could have. For example,
Fanchise League states when it discusses the FAN Token Ecosystem, “[t]he Fan Access

190

See Fan Token Blog, http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017). Fanchise Sports League,
Inc. also hosted a crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo which surpassed their $5 million ask by December 23,
2017. See www.fcfl.io (last visited on August 12, 2018) (“Ten-day campaign was the first token sale ever hosted
by crowdfunding leader Indiegogo (in conjunction with MicroVentures) and garnered attention from the likes of
the New York Times, Forbes, and CoinDesk.”). These offerings were to be followed up with a public digital token
sale for fans looking to gain early access to voting power in March or early April of 2018. See Fan Token Blog,
http://blog.fantoken.network/frequenty/ (Dec. 28, 2017).
191
See MedChain, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited on Aug. 15, 2018) (describing their
SAFT offering).
192
Id.
193
Id.
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Network and FAN Tokens are going to revolutionize the experience of being a sports fan, and
the FCFL will be the first league built on and powered by the Fan Access Network.”194
FINDING C3: TERMS OF DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS HAVE VARIOUS
TERMS (SEE CHART 14).
Chart 14 – Terms and Conditions of Digital Token Offerings
RIGHTS TO TOKENS

Right to receive future utility tokens based on an uncertain future
event (e.g. blockchain and distributed ledger technology)

CONTINGENCY

Based upon the successful development of Tokens, the company
creates a network based on the blockchain upon which the Tokens
function.

TIMING

Uncertain

EVENT

Optional, not guaranteed

VOTING RIGHTS

Tied to decisions of the company or decisions related to other
promotions and events of the company;
Right to Vote on Games

PARTICIPATION RIGHTS

The right to participate in purses and team winnings, based on
number of Tokens investor owns

DECISION FOR THE
CONTINGENT EVENT

The company

TOKEN AVAILABILITY

On wallets on open source and/or future tradeable exchanges

TIED TO OTHER
SECURITIES

Common or Debt plus Tokens

REPAYMENT

In Tokens, Cash, Common Stock

REPAYMENT OPTION
DECISION TO RECEIVE
CASH OR TOKENS

Investor or the company

194

The Fan Token Ecosystem, FAN TOKEN BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), http://blog.fantoken.network/fan-tokenecosystem/.
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PART III: CONCERNS WITH DIGITAL TOKEN OFFERINGS
A. What is Troubling About Digital Token Offerings?
The data of investment crowdfunding company offerings include a range of common
stock, to convertible debt, tokens and coins offered to investors. It demonstrates that investment
crowdfunding offerings have led to mixed results, some troubling developments. On the
positive side, this research supports the assertion that investment crowdfunding has had
momentum, even though still in its infancy. There is greater breadth in publicly offered
crowdfunding campaigns. Those campaigns can be measured by the increasing numbers of
company principal office locations throughout the country; increasing amounts and types of
securities offerings; and an increasing variety of companies that are participating. These
amounts represent a sizable expansion in investment crowdfunding under Reg. CF. The next
section discusses the troubling concerns with digital Token offerings, which include
Uncertainty and Risk with digital tokens, cancelled offerings and goals of Reg. CF yet to be
attained.
1. Uncertainty and Risk
The more troubling discovery in the research is the accelerating movement of companies
offering Reg. CF blockchain based tokens to investors. These investment contracts that include
a possible conversion to a token or coin that is distributable upon the success of blockchain
ledger technology. The greatest concern is the uncertainty of blockchain technology. To the
extent that companies are raising funds based on that success, the likelihood of raising the
necessary funds becomes more speculative. Investment contracts with token conversions are
written such that risk is a given and that there is no guarantee the services or tokens will ever
come to fruition.
The Form C/A’s, C-U’s and C-W’s provide a picture of companies that may be having
difficulty raising capital on the funding portal. C-U allows a company to extend the time that
it can seek funding. 195 The first of the negative results relates to companies that are not able to
raise the funding that they seek.
195

Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last updated Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm#1
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When raising capital, businesses must fulfill their business needs as well as stay apprised
of changing regulations in order to protect their investors and reduce legal liability. To the
extent that businesses successfully raise capital, but fail to appreciate shareholder interests or
potential liability, business losses and securities and fiduciary liability can become real
concerns. A good example of this balancing is the case of Indeco Financial Syndicate, Inc.
which touts itself as one of the first companies to file a registration for Tokens under Reg. CF.196
On the same day as the Indeco Reg. CF filing, the SEC froze the assets of another company,
based in Quebec, that had raised $15 million but failed to register their token offerings.197
An example of a more successful fundraising campaign is Witnet Foundation, a
Delaware company with a principal office in the state of Washington. Witnet raised $1,069,983
from 688 investors by March of 2018.198 One difference in this company’s offering from typical
Reg. CF and other securities offering is that instead of the company repaying its debt obligation
with cash, the company plans to repay the obligation with Wit tokens and 20% interest.199
As Witnet and Indeco suggest, companies face a variety of dilemmas in raising capital.
On the one hand, a company seeks to maintain a sustainable business venture. To do that
requires a basic accountability to their business plan while not being blind to new innovation.
Innovation is believed to be the main driver of long-term economic growth in the United
States.200 But innovation includes uncertainty, which in turn presents the dilemma for a
company in asserting what possibly could go wrong. Towards that end, a best practice would
be to think of what could go wrong and plan to minimize potential liabilities. However,
minimizing liabilities may require not always giving the most valued investors exactly what
they may demand. Thus, the dilemma hinges on how to harness investor satisfaction in an ever

196

David Levine, Press Coverage of Our Efforts To Bring SEC-Compliant Crypto Into the Mainstream,
(Jan. 2018) https://www.startengine.com/indeco (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (Indeco CEO
David Levine is interviewed by Peter Armstrong on the CBC show “On the Money.”); see also Press Release,
Indeco, Indeco Launches First Token Pre-sale under SEC’s Regulation Crowdfunding Rules (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://medium.com/indeco/indeco-launches-first-token-pre-sale-under-secs-regulation-crowdfunding-rulese82dad79345 (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
197
See THE 21 REPORT, supra note 112, at 16; Levine, supra note 191.
198
REPUBLIC.CO, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited August 15, 2018).
199
REPUBLIC.CO, https://republic.co/witnet (last visited October 29, 2018).
200
Brian Krumm, Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark Tank Shouldn’t Be the Model, 70 ARK.
L. REV. 553, 555 (2017).
STARTENGINE.COM
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technologically advancing society. Lastly, a company must always do necessary compliance
to avoid state or federal regulatory discipline.
In Reg. CF capital formation, the ecosystem includes the companies, the funding portals
mandated by the SEC to be used in these offerings, the employees, and the crowd. Companies
raising capital via Reg. CF, are required to be assisted by funding portals in their first steps
towards “going public.” The SEC requires that funding portals follow a variety of rules or be
subject to Section 5(c) of the Securities Act and sections of the Securities Exchange Act.201
Funding portals have additional legal exposure and must make sure to comply with their own
registration requirements.202 To date, companies with token offerings have been assisted by
only four funding portals, while overall, there were forty-three funding portals registered. Also,
companies that use Reg. CF have employees. As one of the normative goals of investment
crowdfunding during the past two years, companies have disclosed over 5,300 employees,
generally. The number is smaller for token offerings, with 149 employees. The investors are
also essential to this ecosystem.

Their particular interest in purchasing coin-based

securities/currencies may also be driving the demand for these products.
The good news is that the current financial movement drives an ecosystem for businesses
to raise funds, hire employees, and include new shareholders into the fold of their business.
The downside is that the token frenzy may wane, leaving investors with shiny coins to satisfy
the obligations and the companies with potential future disputes. One solution to enhanced risk
and potential investor dissatisfaction is to provide robust and clear offering disclosures.
Although difficult to do when funding is needed, companies must recognize that due diligence
requires a long-term view, which includes paying close attention to funding that has a low
probability of repayment. Further, state and federal securities agencies can be helpful by
providing clarity on the allowance or disallowance of certain types of securities. Tokens are

201

See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Steven J. Muehler, et al., No. 2:18-cv-01677-CAS(SKx)
(April 4, 2018) (granting the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the defendant in a case “assert[ing]
claims against defendants for (1) violations of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) . . . for
(2) violations of Sections 10(b), 15(a), and 20(e) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), . . . 78t . . . and
for (3) violations of Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5”).
202
The SEC must demonstrate a prima facie case that defendants have violated Section 5(c) of the Securities
Act. Section 5(c) of the Securities act makes it “unlawful for any person . . . to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to
buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(c) (2012).
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just the latest development in a type of security or reward offered. We can only imagine the
outer limits of virtual securities to come.
One difference in Reg. CF digital tokens is that there are notice filings with the SEC.
Because of that fact, token-funded companies are likely to be more cautious than companies
that either are not registering because they do not think they are offering a security or because
they are trying to circumvent the law. This difference may play out with fewer matters
involving fraud, manipulation and deception charges as can be found with unregistered ICOs.
However, what is more troubling is the complexity of the offerings and the open question
of whether these investors have a basic understanding of what they are buying. This part of the
story will continue to unfold as companies provide disclosures to their buyers as time goes on.
With respect to companies, the warning signs are present. There is volatility in current
blockchain-based transactions that are currently trading. If the company succeeds, then they
not only have successfully raised capital but also will have potentially happy investors. To the
extent that the company does not meet its mission of successfully creating a token utility,
commodity, or security, and the token fails to meet the goals of the offering, then those
companies would be best served by thinking about the alternative plan to the failure of the
offering, which makes Professor Heminway’s assertion so relevant here.203 As we are in an age
of alternative entities, alternative finance, and alternative facts, it behooves companies, their
advisors, investors, and the agencies that have oversight over these transactions, to think long
and hard about the responsibility we each have to other and to ourselves.
Should we should be troubled by the development that Reg. CF is being used for precoin token offerings as a leverage to other coin offerings?204 Rather than fail to register,
companies are engaging in digital token transactions that are exempt from registration in light
of the regulatory uncertainty. This part is understandable as a company would want to avoid

203
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of Alternative Entities, Alternative
Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 227, 256, 259 (2017).
204
See, THE 21 REPORT, supra note 112, after the SEC recently investigated The DAO organization, which
sold DAO tokens to fund investments. The founders described it as a "crowdfunding contract" to raise funds to
create a company in crypto space. Id. The press release notes that although crowdfunding was used to describe the
design, it would not qualify for an exception under Regulation Crowdfunding because the platform or organization
was not registered as “a broker-dealer or a funding portal.” Id.
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securities liability and unintended consequences. 205 But the Reg. CF offering may be just a
means to another larger digital token offering end. Arguably, that leverage is a good thing.
The greater inclusion of pre-token/coin conversions raises long-term sustainability
concerns for companies and long-term viability concerns for investors. The existence of digital
token offerings under Reg. CF, albeit [a small number and] relatively insubstantial in dollar
value as compared to the total number of Reg. CF offerings and the total number of ICOs, raises
many questions for companies and investors. What are the considerations for companies in
choosing Reg. CF digital tokens and how should investors respond? To the extent that
companies are relying on the 4(a)(6) exemption from registration, should these types of coin
offerings and sweeteners be registered as initial coin offerings? What limits should the SEC
set now to protect the crowd from bearing the brunt of the risk of valueless cryptocurrency
repayments or convertible instruments that may never convert to equity or anything of value?
Will the SEC abdicate authority to the extent that companies disclose that risk of loss to the
investing crowd is great or will they intervene to set parameters on this new blockchain based
token movement? It is predictable that if businesses fail, investors will feel taken advantage of,
thus creating heightened legal risk for companies.206
2. Inadequate Disclosures
Another negative indicator in the Reg. CF crowdfunding data is that the disclosures may

205

There are very few cases/matters relating to investment crowdfunding company violations or controversies.
However, in The Matter of: Allen Hydro Electric Corporation related to the offering of debt securities through “an
online equity crowdfunding website.” Allen Hydro Energy Corp., Ohio Dep’t. Comm., Order No. 17-028, at *1
(Sept. 18, 2017). The Ohio Dept. of Comm. found that the Corporation had several violations of the Reg. CF. Id.
at *1–*4. The violations in the Consent Agreement included: a failure to follow the disclosure requirements; Allen
Hydro Electric’s “[b]usiness [p]lan did not have a reasonable basis in fact”; and they failed to follow proper
procedures. Id. at *2. In light of these violations, the Respondent’s crowdfunding attempt did not qualify for the
crowdfunding exemption. See id. at *3. Additionally, the SEC issued several Comment Letters to Worthpoint
Corporation and Sagoon, Inc. See generally Letter from Jeanne Campanelli, Partner, KHLK LLP, to Barbara C.
Jacobs, Assistant Director, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 23, 2016) (SEC digital archives). The SEC
noticed there was an offer to exchange common stock purchased under Reg. CF for other shares. See id. Both
companies stated that it was to "grant those shareholders the greater informational rights and ability to freely resell
their shares that Regulation A provides, and place all the company's shareholders on an equal footing." Id.
206
Two questions, not addressed in this article, relate to the uncertainty of blockchain’s success as most of
the ICO or Reg. CF is tied to the Blockchain. Further, the strength or flaws of the company’s business model are
also important.
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comply with the requirements of the Securities laws, but still fail the investors.207 The reasons
may have to do with the inability to portray through disclosure the level of risk that is involved
in investing in the particular company.208 This is even truer in the case of blockchain based
token offerings under Reg. CF.209 Most governmental agencies have a difficult time explaining
what the risks are for the purchase of a blockchain based token, let alone a startup company
working with a group of advisors, funding portals, and employees new to this new
technology.210

Most unsophisticated investors would not likely have the background to

understand the terms of these offerings.211 Even though the disclosures may appear adequate,
it seems unlikely that investors would understand whether it is likely or unlikely that he/she
will ever receive a digital token and whether the company is able to implement its version of
smart contracts on the blockchain.212 This leads to the third negative indicator and that relates
to where those disclosures, or lack thereof, leave unsophisticated investors.
3. Investors in Limbo
Before the recent crash of coins, it may have been difficult for investors to think clearly
when there were so many varying reports that coin purchasers were profiting in large
amounts.213 It sounds good, but understanding the distinctions between companies, services,
offerings, timetables, terms and conditions, can have an adverse effect on investors. The worst
case is that an investor spends hard earned cash on a company’s capital campaign and loses his
or her money. The likely case is that the investor will be left in limbo wondering whether the
company’s goods or services will ever allow for a token to be issued and exchanged on some
future distributed ledger.214

207

See Hinman, supra note 3.
See id.
209
See id.
210
See Jack Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and
Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 604 (2013).
211
See id. at 605.
212
See id.
213
Rohr & Wright, supra note 19, at 81.
214
Id., at 82–83.
208
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An illustration of investors in limbo, is to observe the frequent postings by investors
who purchased Indeco Dusto digital tokens. Several months after Indeco exceeded its minimum
capital request, raising over $171,000, investors began to ask about the progress of the
development of the digital tokens and the blockchain. Below are the string of posts (as included
on the StartEngine website) between a frustrated investor and the company on the StartEngine
funding portal website on November 30, 2018:215
“…Potential Investor 4 months ago
Still no peep. The writing seems to be on the wall and yet I saw Indeco
continues to sell the theoretical tokens at a discount on other forums.
I should have known better.”
Around a month later, a company representative responds:
“…Indeco - Issuer 3 months ago
Hi Richard -- we've been focusing on building out the platform and
qualifying for our Security Token Offering with the SEC. It's a brutal process.
Now that we're solidly in business, with revenue and technology (no longer
a theoretical company), I'll be in closer touch.
You should have my personal email address as I've sent notes to all investors
in the past. Feel free to contact me directly. Happy to give investors my cell # as well.
When we pull off the STO, you'll be glad you invested. :) David”
A couple of months later, the Investors inquires again.
“…Potential Investor 17 days ago
…Have not have much communication other than the post below related to the status
of the SAFT investment. The March 2019 deadline is coming up where are SAFTs
could potentially become worthless. Is the company on track to issue tokens soon or
before the deadline? The lack of communication and updates makes it seem as if the
company is waiting until the expiration date so that the SAFTs expire worthless. I
have reached out many times on the Indeco website and through this platform asking
for updates and have never received a response to my e-mails which does not give me
confidence in the project being successful. I think many SAFT investors would like
some communication on the status of this investment with the expiration date coming
up. Also if the expiration date in March is reached does the company plan on
extending the deadline per the provision in the SAFT agreement or will the company
let the SAFTs expire?”
“…Potential Investor 7 days ago

215

Startengine website, https://www.startengine.com/indeco (Last retrieved on November 30, 2018)
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Is anyone from the company ever going to reply back and give us s recent update? I
have reached out through the portal and the company web[s]ite numerous times.
Starting to think are money is gone... shouldn’t be that hard to get s response from
someone.”

There was no posted company’s response as of November 30, 2018.
4. Cancelled Offerings
Another troubling concern is that not all companies have successfully raised funds
through these digital token offerings, as some of the offerings have been cancelled. Some
companies fail to raise the capital needed for their emerging enterprises. However, to the extent
there is uncertainty about the outcome of digital token transactions and higher risk in
transactions based on blockchain technologies, that lack of participation could be a good thing
for the potential investors and possibly the companies. On the other hand, if companies can
raise capital and grow successful businesses, providing needed services and goods to the
communities, then the failure to participate in Reg. CF investment crowdfunding will impact
the potential economic growth for years to come.
Three companies withdraw from their Reg. CF digital token offerings during the time
period. One example is Access Network Labs, Inc., a Delaware-incorporated company located
in New York, launched a token debt asset offering.216 Access Network had a noble goal of
“[c]reating access to financial and technological tools for the word’s [sic] 1.7 billion unbanked
adults through the development of a sustainable decentralized bank.”217 The minimum funding
goal was $100,000, with a minimum investment of $50 in return for an Access Token.218 Their
maximum funding goal was to raise $1.07 million.219 Access Network Labs had a breakdown
for the token sale: 30% of the tokens were dedicated to growing the branchless banking
infrastructure and user base; 30% of the tokens were to be dedicated to rewarding the
development of applications; and the remaining were tokens towards the sale (21%), founding

216

Access Network Labs, Inc., Offering Memo (Form C) (May 30, 2018), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739626/000173962618000001/formc.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2018)
(offering Token DPA, Series S-a DPAs (Debt Payable by Assets), 100,000 units at a $1.00 price).
217
Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
218
Id.
219
See id.
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team (12%), community rewards (3%), and advisors (4%).220 However, after initially amending
the offering, the company withdrew the offering on July 27, 2018.221
Two other companies withdrew their digital token offerings during this period. Time
Token, Inc. had a principal office in Arizona and was incorporated in Delaware.222 On May 23,
2018, Time Token sought to raise $107,000 for its goal of merging blockchain technology with
vacation rental real estate, to bring liquidity to the vacation rental market. Their digital token
was called Preferred Equity (PET) Tokens. However, by September 9, 2018, Time Token
withdrew its offer to sell PET tokens to the general public after raising over $22,000.223 A third
example was FrToken, Inc., a company based in New Mexico and incorporated in Nevada.
FrToken offered a CHIKN Token on April 20, 2018 with the goal of creating a decentralized
blockchain-based platform that allows companies to pay audiences directly for watching ads
and answering surveys.224 The CHIKN token represented a single share of Series B Common
Stock of this company. After raising over $11,000 of the $107,000 maximum funding sought,
they too filed a Form C-W and withdrew the offering on October 1, 2018.225
It is also possible that these companies underestimated the costs or potential liabilities. In the
case of FrToken, they raised over the minimum ask of $9000, which in this regulatory
environment, may not have been enough to remain sustainable.
It would take additional research to determine the reasons why these companies were
not successful in their crowdfunding campaigns. The top four reasons that a company fails are
that there was no market need for their goods or services; they simply ran out of money; 226
they didn’t have the right team formed; and they lacked the proper competitive advantages to
220

See id.
EDGAR Search Results, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/cgibin/browse-edgar?CIK=1739626&owner=exclude&action=getcompany (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); see also,
Access Network, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/access-network (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (showing caption of
“Cancelled! Access Network has withdrawn their campaign.”). The reason for the withdrawal is not listed on the
website. Id. A withdrawal could also indicate a retooling or finding capital through another exempt or non-exempt
offering.
222
Time Token, Inc. Offering memorandum (Form C) filed May 23, 2018 available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739501/000166516018000482/0001665160-18-000482-index.htm
223
Time Token Form C-W filed September 7, 2018 available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1739501/000166516018000905/0001665160-18-000905-index.htm
224
FrToken, Inc. Form C filed April 20, 2018 available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1736160/000166516018000313/0001665160-18-000313-index.htm
225
FrToken, Inc. Form C-W filed October 1, 2018 available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1736160/000166516018000313/0001665160-18-000313-index.htm
226
See id.
221
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continue with the business.227 Timing of offerings is also important and to the extent that the
offering does not go well, that may present problems for the company. However, it is also
possible that a withdrawal could indicate a retooling or landing alternative capital from a more
private source.
5. Crowdfund Act Goals Yet To Be Attained
In light of the research findings, it is highly questionable whether the normative
goals of the Crowdfund Act have been fulfilled. There is still much work to be done on the two
goals of encouraging small business growth and furthering employment, specifically to
“help entrepreneurs raise the capital they need to put Americans back to work and create an
economy that’s built to last.”228 There are two reasons for this concern. First, considering
investment crowdfunding’s potential as a decentralizing, democratizing tool,229 With more
encouragement and decreased costs, we may see more activity. Second the fact that more rapid
growth is occurring in blockchain based tokens is disconcerting, as this shares similarities with
the proliferation of unsound mortgages in the 2008 mortgage debacle. One must hope that this
trend will turn out differently. Let us hope that it will. To the extent that the blockchain does
not become a reality, jobs will be at stake. Also, there are geographical considerations that have
impacts on the future success of capital formation.

Some areas of the country are not

participating in either investment crowdfunding generally, or in the more specialized digital
token offerings.
6. Alternative Financing
For companies, theoretically, there are a variety of financings that would be available

227
Triin Linagmi, The Most Common Reasons Startups Fail, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3044519/7-of-the-most-common-reasons-startups-fail noting (Some companies
run out of cash before they are able to raise the funds.)
228
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama To Sign Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstartour-business-startups-jobs-act
229
Rohr & Wright, supra note 19, at 7–8.
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for amounts under $ 1,000,000.230 Some of the most common alternative financing measures
for financing up to $ 1 million include friend and family financing, bank and government loan
financing, factoring and peer to peer lending.
Friends and Family Financing – This is defined as funding from members of the
business owners’ family and friends who provide loans for debt or cash for equity in the
company. Family and friend’s contributions are additional to cash and other contributions
provided by the owners, themselves (commonly called bootstrapping). This early stage
financing is not discussed in this article, since it is typically provided at the early stages of
the business and not in this growth cycle of the business.
Bank and Government Loans – One traditional way for a business to get capital is to
obtain a loan from their bank, community development organization small business
investment company or other lender.231 The business can also seek a guarantee of their loan
from the Small Business Administration.
Factoring is the outright purchase of a business’ outstanding accounts receivable by a
commercial finance company at a “factor” which is typically between 70 percent and 90
percent of the receivable at the time the company purchases it.232
Peer to Peer Lending – In peer-to-peer networks, “the borrower gets a cheaper loan than
the banks and credit card companies offer. The lender gets more interest than offered in the
bank or the bond market. The lenders…take the risk that they may never see their money
again…websites such as Prosper and Lending Club…function like a bank loan officer, taking
loan applications, checking credit scores, employment and debt levels. They say they reject 90
percent of applicants. Lending Club, for instance, requires a minimum FICO score of 660. The
national average credit score is about 690.233
For companies with excellent credit ratings, access to accredited and sophisticated
investors, angel networks, other alternatives may be available, such as angel investments,
venture capital financing, private placements and initial public offerings (IPO’s). It is unlikely

230

Sources include Indiana Venture Center, Successful Angel Investing (January 2015) and Donald F.
Kuratko, Entrepreneurship Theory, Process, Practice, Part II, Chapter 8, Sources of Capital for
Entrepreneurial Ventures, p. 232.
231
Jerome Katz and Richard P. Green, III, ENTREPRENEURIAL SMALL BUSINESS, Chapter 15,
Small Business Finance: Using Equity, Debt, and Gifts (McGraw-Hill Irwin, NY 2014) at pp. 500-501.
232
Allbusiness.com, See http://www.allbusiness.com/the-difference-between-factoring-andaccounts-receivable-financing-14847411- 1.html, retrieved on March 9, 2016.
233
Jim Gallagher, Is Lending to Strangers Smart Investing?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Jan. 27, 2013).
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that the companies availing themselves of financing under Reg. CF, have these tools available
to them.
B. Positive Findings
1. Some Companies Attained Goals
A positive outcome about investment crowdfunding was that a number of successful
offerings occurred during this time period. On April 6, 2018, Wellbeing Brewing Company,
LLC, a St. Louis based company organized in Missouri, conducted a Reg. CF crowdfunding
offering.234 The company sought to raise a minimum of $125,000 up to a maximum of
$200,000 and provide investors convertible notes paying 6% interest, which would be
payable by April 6, 2023.235 The company’s goal is to create a healthy craft beer for
customers who do not drink alcohol. This novel customer product was well received by
investors, which allowed Wellbeing to raise $199,000 from 70 investors and successfully
close their offering within three months’ time.

Wellbeing conducted its offering via

NVSTED,236 a St. Louis Regional Economic Development Partnership-developed a funding
portal through its website Nvstedwithus.com.237
MedChain, Inc., a Delaware incorporated company located in Colorado, quickly
became oversubscribed for its offering of a minimum of $10,000 of common stock with a
SAFT to a maximum of $1.07 million.238 The company seeks to develop a “community234
Wellbeing Brewing Company, LLC Form C,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
235
Wellbeing Brewing Company LLC, Form C, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1731872/000173187218000002/formc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018);
See also, WELLBEING BREWING COMPANY, https://wellbeingbrewing.com/ (last visited October 3, 2018).
236
Brian Feldt and Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership Launches Nvsted, a New
Crowdfunding Platform, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/stlouis-economic-development-partnership-launches-nvsted-a-new-crowdfunding/article_e539c20c-04c8-547585a9-cfc87e25bd13.html.
237
Jacob Barker, St. Louis Economic Development Partnership launching crowdfunding platform, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-economic-developmentpartnership-launching-crowdfunding-platform/article_50f3a1bf-7564-5e38-b2c6-f8b54b130193.html.
238
MedChain, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited Sept. 14, 2018); See also
MedChain, Form C, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1726640/000166516018000130/xslC_X01/primary_doc.xml (last
visited Oct. 7, 2018).

65

|Page

Patricia H. Lee (forthcoming St. John’s Law Review, Vol. 92:4, March 2019) [10-Dec-2018 11:50am

driven solution” to the growing field of electronic medical records and electronic protected
health information.239 Although the company did not raise the maximum amount sought,
after raising $466,896, MedChain closed the offering to additional investors.240
Another example of a successful offering is Farm From a Box, Inc.241 Farm from a
Box, Inc. is a California benefit corporation, incorporated on February 6, 2012 with principal
offices located in San Francisco, California.242 This company has developed an innovative
modularly designed farm system that provides tools and technology needed to support a 2-acre
off-grid farm. The company manufactures and sells its farm system to consumers and largescale buyers with the hope of connecting communities to healthy, sustainably grown food and
revolutionizing local food production.243 They initially set SAFEs244 funding goals of a
minimum amount of $25,000 and maximum amount of $535,000.245 However, they amended
their offering amounts to $100,000 with a greater maximum of $999,999 in a later Form C/A
filing.246 Although not their maximum target goal, the company ultimately raised $148,999
from 240 investors and concluded their first campaign in March 2018.247 As this company is a
startup with a bold idea, they will continue to need capital, which suggests there is still risk for
their initial investors.248
For companies that sought to form capital with digital tokens, there were two of note
that leveraged the Reg. CF offering and continued to raise greater levels of capital. One
company, Item Banc, Inc, is a company located and organized in South Carolina that is a tech

239

MedChain, StartEngine, https://www.startengine.com/medchain (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
Id.
241
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
242
Farm from a Box, Form C/A, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf; see also FARM
FROM A BOX, www.farmfromabox.com (last visited Oct. 29, 2018).
243
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Oct. 3, 2018). See also
Form
C-AR
filed
May
1,
2018,
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1679373/000167937316000006/FFABformC.pdf.
244
The SAFEs were called Crowd Safe, an investment contract between investors and companies, wherein
the investment is “in exchange for the chance to earn a return—in the form of equity in the company—if it’s
acquired or has an IPO.” How the Crowd Safe works, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/learn/investors/crowdsafe (last
visited Oct. 29, 2018). The Crowd Safe was developed by the Platform Republic. Id.
245
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
246
Farm from a Box, Amendment to Offering Statement (Form C/A) (Jul. 21, 2016) (identifying an
offering deadline of December 16, 2016).
247
Farm from a Box, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/farm-from-a-box (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
248
See Wroldsen, supra note 7, at 551–53 (discussing potential and risks of SAFE investments).
240
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Company supporting Basic Human need products in five categories: Food, Building Materials,
Basic Clothing, Paper Products, and Hygiene. On June 18, 2018 Item Banc, offered $1.07
million under Reg. CF of IBE Tokens to the general public. This offering occurred after the
company had filed a notice of exempt offering under Reg. D Rule 504. In August, 2018, after
one extension request on the previous filings, Item Banc amended the earlier filings and filed a
Form 1-A with Reg. A disclosures about its $20 million offering of IBE tokens.249 EpigenCare,
Inc., a digital biotech company, located and organized in New York, leveraged the initial Reg.
CF. filing along with a Reg. D Rule 506(c) offering. On March 20, 2018, Epigen, Inc. filed
both a Form C to offer $1.07 million dollars of EPIC Tokens and a Form D to offer $20 million
dollars of the tokens. In a later Form C-U filing, Epigen, Inc. reported that it did not meet its
maximum goal of raising over one million dollars under the Reg. CF, the company was able to
raise over $36,700 under Reg. CF and continue raising funds from accredited investors in the
Reg. D filing.250
2. Coastal Dispersion
Other ways to measure the scope of investment crowdfunding include evaluating the
geographical distribution of the company transactions; the choices of entity made by the
companies and offering characteristics. The data collected here reveals a longitudinal study of
the changes that have occurred over the two-year period. The most pronounced changes relate
to diffusion in intermediation; concentration of the offerings geographically; a pronounced
preference toward incorporating or organizing LLC’s in Delaware; and a normalizing of the
types of securities offered.
The bulk of investment crowdfunding digital token offerings financing companies are
mainly located in the west coast. The geographic distribution, set forth in this study, illustrates
the regional divide with respect to investment crowdfunding and even more so, in digital token
transactions, where offerings essentially are developing on the west coast.251 This coastal
concentration in digital token offerings, yet funding portal dispersal nationwide appears to be
249

Item Banc, Inc. (Form C, C/A) available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?CIK=1742134&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&Find=Search
250
EpigenCare, Inc. (Form C, C/A, C-U and D/A filings) available at https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browseedgar?CIK=1727821&owner=exclude&action=getcompany&Find=Search
251
See id.
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similar to what Professor Magnuson called “diffusion” in the Fintech Markets.252 In Fintech
markets, the players have “smaller sections of the market, focus on narrow industry areas, and
often are made up of a number of nimble start-ups . . . or even computer servers.”253 From the
data collected between 2016 and 2018, the funding portals have greater concentrations of
offerings, while at the same time a greater number of smaller actors continue to play a role in
advancing inclusion with respect to offerings in the marketplace. This dispersal illustrates
pockets of digital token offerings concentrated within two – four funding portals, but a wider
variety of funding portals and offerings nationwide.
While the investment crowdfunding study did not look at incorporation or
organizational documents, what is apparent from The Form C filings is that there is more
concentration of companies selecting Delaware as the preferred choice of entity than in 2016.254
These choices of entity seem related to “the scope of directors’ fiduciary duties, permissible
charter and bylaw terms, and shareholder voting rights”— which Professor Lipton states “are
controlled by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation has
any real economic ties to that location.”255 Empirical work on choice of entity has also
“illuminate[d] how parties actually behave” and how the “parties would be likely to behave in
response to legal rules.”256

Professor Chen’s study contradicted the fact that business

corporations that heavily favored Delaware as the state of incorporation actually preferred New
York for choice of law and forum in the context of merger agreements.257

252

See Magnuson, supra note 168, at 7–8.
Id.
254
More research would be needed to determine the reasons for this flight to Delaware. It could be a function
of larger transactions, herd behavior, or other legal, business and tax considerations. See Magnuson, supra note
168, at 22 (explaining reasons for herd behavior in Fintech markets: “This may occur in several different ways,
but perhaps the simplest involves computer programs sharing certain programming templates. If an algorithm
proves successful in the market, other actors may be tempted to simply copy or replicate the algorithm.”).
255
Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Charters and
Bylaws, 104 GEORGETOWN L. J. 583, 597 (2016).
256
Chen, supra note 180, at 6, 31–32 (“This conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached in the Eisenberg
and Miller study that, if a company is incorporated in Delaware, the company has a tendency to choose New York
law.").
257
Id. at 3–4.
253
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3. A Business Disruption?
“All business disruptions begin with business innovations.”258 There are several reasons
that investment crowdfunding may contribute to business disruption and innovation. First, as
Commissioner Quintenz claimed, digital tokens “hav[e] and will continue to have, an impact
on title transfer and settlement processes . . .,” or otherwise a “back office tokenization
revolution.”259 There is a belief that “digital assets are here to stay.”260 Where there is a belief,
it will be just a matter of time before digital ledger technology will be able to verify entries
between parties and scale to the proportion required for continuous use.
What is more unlikely is that smart contracts will alleviate the need for middle men and
women, until there is a potential reduction in transaction costs and also regulatory costs. 261 Just
recently, when the cost of bitcoin dropped below $3,500, pundits argue that the market price
for bitcoin could drop to $0 because the mining transaction cost would be more than the
potential investment.262 Which suggests that beneath the blockchain layer, there are middle men
and without social or economic incentives, it is unclear how the blockchain sustains itself
without drivers. It is evident that theoretically, smart contracts can allow self-regulation without
third party intervention. However, will it allow self-regulation in the long term, which long
term is the real innovation.
Second, as Reg. CF offerings are growing, the need for a company to seek venture capital
and angel investor funding may be replaced by this new mechanism for financing.263 Arguably
the manner in which investment crowdfunding may disrupt these markets depends on the
continued success of Reg. CF. Commentators argue that there are several ways venture capital
could be disrupted by investment crowdfunding: Actual democratization of access to capital;
the traditionally underfunded can become successfully funded by this new access to capital;
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Eric Biber et al., Regulating Business Innovation as Policy Disruption: From the Model T to Airbnb, 70
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and that there is a proliferation of companies that do not seek the same exit and end goals as
venture capitalists.264
FINDING D1: BUSINESS DISRUPTION IS LIKELY IF DIGITAL TOKENS
RELIANT ON THE BLOCKCHAIN ARE REALIZED, BUT WHEN
There has been no sizeable disruption in investment crowdfunding, digital tokens or in
capital formation as of this writing. Again, the story of business disruption and innovation will
take some time to determine if companies, the marketplace, investors and the communities are
measurably changed because of the offering of the variety of securities under Reg. CF. In the
event that companies are able to create a fully viable digital token reliant on blockchain
technology, that endeavor could be an innovative business disruption.
There is one way that Reg. CF digital tokens are disrupting the investment marketplace
and one way they are not.. On the positive disruption, these offerings can be a leverage to other,
future initial coin offerings (“ICOs” or “initial coin offerings”). This development may provide
both potentially good disruptive qualities to the investment marketplace depending on the
success of blockchain technology.
On the other hand, there appears to be no disruption outside of the coastal areas and
larger cities throughout the county. For example, funding portals generally have some control
over what offerings are hosted nationally. The idea that a novel innovation in the state of
Montana could find capital through and connect to investors interested in this idea is unlikely.
Reg. CF financing is not yet democratizing capital and innovating in that manner. Second,
there are a host of traditionally underfunded individuals, groups, neighborhoods, and companies
that have yet to benefit from new blockchain-based technologies. Unless there are better ways
to connect the traditionally underfunded with funding portals and structures, that disruption has
not yet to evolve. Third, currently, the data suggests that companies currently offering capital
are still connected to the idea of exit strategies. Most notable are the companies that are reliant
on blockchain as a business strategy and the likelihood that the business concept will obtain
further investment after the initial investment under Reg. CF. Thus, Reg. CF is not yet
disruptive in these positive ways.
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See Marks, supra note 3, at 3–6.
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What advocates of capital formation would not want to have happen is an adverse
disruption to occur. To the extent that investors begin to invest in poorly conceived or
speculative investments, this activity could have a negative effect on attracting new investors
to these markets. This could lead to effects similar to those witnessed during the housing
mortgage crisis of 2008, where a large influx of participants in the market had dire
consequences when the market collapsed. The concern is that investors not be put in a similar
position as investors and purchasers in 2008. In the next section, I provide some solutions to
these troubling developments in digital tokens.

PART IV: LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
As much as $600 million seems like a significant amount of financing. However, that
figure pales in comparison to ICOs, Reg. A, A+, Reg. D, 1933 Act IPO’s and other capital
raising alternatives. Although this research does not quantify the unmet business need for
capital nationwide, the initial normative goals were to help entrepreneurs throughout the fifty
states and the District of Columbia as well as to grow employment nationwide. At the same
time, the idea that investors may lose their investments is not a positive tradeoff for capital
formation and employment.
In light of the research, the author provides recommendations towards a path forward.
Below are several recommendations after reviewing the data. The first relates to actions that
the SEC should consider immediately. The second suggestion would be for companies to
consider. The last are suggestions for economic development organizations.
A. SEC Re-Evaluate Reg. CF
The first recommendation is the most difficult to frame. On the one hand, if the
SEC regulates too much, then innovation in new types of securities and capital formation
can die. On the other hand, if the SEC regulates too late, then they are reacting to a worst
case scenario where investors have already lost their money and companies are placed in a
position of liability. The SEC must balance the time and manner in which it regulates. That
being the case, first, I recommend that the SEC re-evaluate whether Reg. CF will be able
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to attain the goals of job creation and capital formation, in light of the current status of
investment crowdfunding and the ongoing sales of SAFTs and digital tokens.
Unfortunately, this solution will ripen only after the investment crowdfunding campaigns
discussed in this article have concluded and other metrics have concluded such as the
expiration of the blockchain development and a period of period of time to evaluate the
sustainability of companies that participated. Potential evaluation time periods could be: A
first step after the offering period ends for all companies with offerings through June 30,
2018. How much capital did these particular raise? The second step would be to evaluate
the success or failure of the companies that offered digital tokens reliant on blockchain
development has either occurred or failed. Did these companies accomplish their goal and
did they provide investors with digital tokens? The third step would be to evaluate the
success of these companies after a minimal period of five years to determine whether the
companies are sustainable or facing financial difficulties, in the worst case, bankruptcy.
These evaluation steps will provide great information for the SEC.
If the short term, the SEC should publish a very detailed guidance for unaccredited
and unsophisticated investors. Much of the SEC’s attention has been directed towards
unregistered initial coin offerings and ICO’s, with material misstatements sold to
accredited investors. As the proliferation of Reg. CF digital tokens continues and there is
no certainty in blockchain technology, it is imperative that the SEC provide guidance
directly to smaller investors intrigued by Reg. CF coin investments. Current SEC guidance
is helpful, but while the language typically references ICO’s, it does not distinguish
between the ICO market and Reg. CF transactions. Shareholders might think that the
warnings regarding ICOs do not apply to them. However, as companies are getting their
first batch of funding from small investors before advancing to ICO markets and Venture
Capital funding, it is important for the SEC and investment advisors to educate those small
investors who may be taking the greatest investment risk. More guidance may deter what
happened when investors purchased synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)265 or
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“mortgage-backed securities that lost value when the housing bubble burst.”266 In that
advisory, the SEC must clarify its position on Reg. CF digital tokens for these investors.
The author recognizes that this alternative may be considered only an ideal solution for
the investors who will read the materials, but not so much for those who do not. That being the
case, there would be a greater chance that some investors would properly weigh the risk of loss
to their own financial situation. Better yet, if these investors had advisors, the advisor could
assist them in better understanding the terms and conditions in which they plan to invest. One
cannot underestimate the level of potential loss in these offerings. Not to knock penny stocks,
but if one invests $2,000 in a penny stock, the investor still can lose 100% ($2,000), not just a
penny.
B. Issuers Weigh Other Financing “Alternatives”
Third, companies, particularly those that are tipping into tokens, should thoughtfully
consider alternatives to Reg. CF digital tokens. There remains a level of speculation in these
transactions, which could result in liability or greater risk than the alternative financings.
Companies should fully consider a backup plan in the event of an unsuccessful token asset
offering, whatever the reason for the failure.267 Although investment crowdfunding shows signs
of being an innovative bridge to capital, the author notes some developments that raise
uncertainties for companies and investors.
Some of the inferences are encouraging, and raising $600 million is a good start.
However, other aspects of the scope of investment crowdfunding transactions, such as the
escalation of digital assets in Reg. CF transactions, show some warning signs. Lawmakers,
scholars, and industry representatives should continue to closely monitor this rapidly growing
development to help foster a healthy, inclusive, and efficient expansion of company capital.
Companies should carefully weigh “alternatives” to the coin alternative of raising
capital. To the extent that the company has no clue what a cryptocurrency or blockchain is,
they should consider alternatives to this form of investment. It is possible that developing a
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Id. at 678.
Reasons might include slow timing of the blockchain; the business concept does not evolve; or merely
because digital token sales begin to flatten.
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new digital asset to be traded on the blockchain is exactly what that company needs to grow its
business. That decision comes with due diligence and the right partners to help form the right
strategies for the business.
C. Economic Development Organizations Lead The Alternatives
Nvested is an excellent example of an economic development organization partnering
with others to develop a funding portal to raise capital for companies in the state of Missouri.268
After a successful campaign to launch Wellness Brewing, LLC, the funding portal announced
recently that it is available to launch other offerings for companies.269 To realize the goals of
capital and job creation, economic development organizations would seemingly play a greater
role in expanding opportunities for companies to connect with potential investors.
Dozens of states are not participating in Reg. CF offerings. The question as to why that
is may be a function of other alternatives that are available to companies in non-participating
states, but also may be a need for organizations to develop funding portals that are ready,
willing, and able to assist with the launching of these offerings. If it is not the will, what appears
to be missing in states that are not participating is the way to participate. That is where
economic development organizations can play a significant role in this new method of capital
formation.

V. CONCLUSION
This research study provides a snapshot of investment crowdfunding’s broadening
scope as a vehicle for capital formation. In Part I, the author discussed what success under Reg.
CF would be. The author suggested that success would be: companies engaged; companies
raising capital; and investors with a likely potential of a return on investment. Using that success
metric, the results are mixed. As parts of the story is still unfolding, the final story of
company/investor success or failure remains to be told. However, what we can glean from the
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study is that companies are engaged in capital campaigns using Reg. CF. Some companies
have been able to raise capital, while others continue to fail at raising funds. Investors, however,
are seemingly at risk of losing their investments as the securities are developing and reliant on
theoretical ideas. Time will tell whether those who were the first to invest in blockchain based
digital tokens will be successful or not.
To recap, with respect to the types of securities offered, one can label this emergence
as either troubling or a looming disaster that is waiting to happen. The offering of blockchainbased tokens is novel but selling these securities to unsophisticated and non-accredited investors
is not ideal in the best case, and a travesty, in the worst case. These concerns give traction to
the scholars who have expressed concerns about the type of securities that might be offered
under Reg. CF. When Reg. CF was adopted, digital tokens were not initially conceptualized at
the time of the approval of the regulations. Primarily because of the great uncertainty of these
securities, adds to the concern that startup companies will not succeed with their business goals
and will not raise the boats of investors along with the communities they seek to serve.
However, there are positive and encouraging developments in Reg. CF investment
crowdfunding. First, there is an opening up of a variety of securities markets for the crowd to
invest in companies as they so choose. There is an availability of an assortment of investments
that allow the crowd to capitalize enterprises. More companies are able to avail themselves to
a public access to capital with their first step towards “going public.” It is also good to know
that funding portals are developing across the country and providing a technological solution
for fundraising campaigns.
The investment crowdfunding phenomenon of securities digitally offered to the public
has the potential of disrupting both the way companies capitalize their business and the manner
in which funding portals and the crowd support these companies.270 As Reg. CF offerings are
growing, the need for companies to seek venture capital and angel investor funding may be
replaced to a degree by this new mechanism for financing. Arguably, the manner and extent to
270

See Wales, supra note 13, at 218 (discussing global securities crowdfunding); see Schwartz, supra note
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which investment crowdfunding may disrupt these markets depends on the continued success
of Reg. CF, blockchain technology, and the interest of investors.
It is argued that there are three ways venture capital could be disrupted by investment
crowdfunding: Actual democratization of access to capital; the traditionally underfunded can
become successfully funded by this new access to capital; and the proliferation of companies
not seeking the same exit and end goals as venture capitalists.271 However, using this basis, the
data does not reflect any sizeable disruption at this time. First, funding portals generally have
some control over what offerings are hosted nationally. The idea that a novel innovation in the
state of Montana could find capital through and connect to investors interested in this idea, is
unlikely. Democratization is the ability to pick up the phone and make a phone call. Reg. CF
financing is not democratizing capital in that manner yet. Secondly, there are a host of
traditionally underfunded individuals, groups, neighborhoods, and companies that are still
underfunded. Unless there are greater ways to connect the traditionally underfunded with
funding portals and structures, that disruption has not yet to evolve. Most notable are the
companies that rely on the blockchain as a business strategy and the likelihood that the business
concept will obtain further investment after the initial investment under Reg. CF. Thus, Reg.
CF is not disruptive in these positive ways yet. However, Reg. CF’s disruptive effects still have
potential.
Another concern is whether investment crowdfunding could be a disrupter in a negative
way. To the extent that investors begin to invest in poorly conceived or speculative investments
and lose their money, this activity could have a negative effect on future investors in the
marketplace. To ensure that investors not revisit the devastation of the mortgage debacle of
2008, caution is the word of the day. However, the possibility of a future being recreated by
the successful development of blockchain technology is not a bad dream to have.
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29,088 with footnotes.
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20,426 without footnotes.
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